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OPENING SCHUMER’S BOX: THE EMPIRICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN CONSUMER FINANCE
DISCLOSURE LAW
Hosea H. Harvey*
This Article explores the fundamental failure of Congress’ twenty-five-year quest to
utilize disclosure as the primary tool to both regulate credit card issuers and educate
consumers. From inception until present, reforms to this disclosure regime, even
when premised on judgment and decision-making behavioralism, were nomothetic
in orientation and ignored clear differences in population behavior and the heter-
ogeniety of consumers. Current law prohibits credit card issuers from acquiring
consumer socio-demographic data and prevents issuers and regulators from using
market and policy experimentation to enhance disclosure’s efficacy. To explain why
this regime was structured this way and why it must change, this Article contains
four key sections: (1) a comprehensive review of the creation of our modern con-
sumer credit card regulatory scheme; (2) a survey of the empirical evidence used to
update and expand that disclosure-centered regime over twenty-five years; (3) an
account of why the existing scheme’s disclosure function substantially fails, not-
withstanding recent reforms; and (4) an argument that to achieve optimal credit
card disclosure efficacy, the law must permit issuers to acquire and utilize customer
socio-demographic information, including race, gender, and other characteristics.
INTRODUCTION
In 1985, New York City experienced one of the worst crime waves
in its history. In a desperate attempt to deter theft from cars, New
Yorkers posted signs in their car windows reading “no radio.”1 One
November night in Brooklyn, Representative Charles E. Schumer
parked his car under a streetlight for the night.2 His maroon sedan
was filled with boxes beautifully wrapped in green and red.3 The
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1. George L. Kelling, How New York Became Safe: The Full Story, CITY JOURNAL, July 2009
available at http://www.city-journal.org/2009/nytom_ny-crime-decline.html (last visited Oc-
tober 9, 2014).
2. Surprise Holiday Gift for a Brooklyn Thief, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1985, at B8.
3. Id.
59
60 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 48:1
next morning Schumer found his car with a broken window and
the boxes gone.4 As it turned out, the boxes were empty—they were
mock presents that Schumer had planned to use as props at a news
conference the next morning. At that news conference, Schumer
addressed what he saw as an even greater consumer crime—the
high rates and unclear disclosure practices of consumer credit card
issuers.5
Schumer’s news conference and his subsequent well-publicized
campaign against credit card issuers first drew attention to interest-
rate capping.6 Schumer was motivated by a general trend where
credit card interest rates were moving inversely proportional to
market interest rates for other types of loans7 and the ballooning of
credit card interest rates to roughly fifteen percent greater than the
Consumer Price Index (CPI).8 Soon after it became clear that Schu-
mer’s rate-cap legislation would never pass,9 he proposed that
Congress help consumers choose the right credit cards and learn
how to use these cards more effectively and efficiently. Schumer’s
new proposal was enacted as the Fair Credit and Charge Card Dis-
closure Act of 1988 (the Disclosure Act).10 The Disclosure Act’s
chief reform to credit card law was the Schumer box, a tabular for-
mat that displayed required information in credit card advertising
and in credit card billing statements and that was intended to edu-
cate and inform consumers.11 Whether consumers would find
Schumer’s model gift to consumers—his tabular box—to be full of
value or empty promises remained an open question.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Susan Harrigan, How High Is Too High For Credit Cards? The Mixed Record of
Rate Caps, NEWSDAY, Feb. 16, 1987, at 1.
7. S. REP. NO. 100-259, at 2 (1987) (citing FUNCTIONAL COST ANALYSIS, published annu-
ally by the Federal Reserve).
8. See, e.g., Tim Chen, Historical Credit Card Interest Rates, NERDWALLET, http://www
.nerdwallet.com/blog/credit-card-data/historical-credit-card-interest-rates/ (last visited Feb-
ruary 15, 2014).
9. Harrigan, supra note 6 (“Schumer [had] called for national credit-card interest rate
ceilings in the past, but this year he’s backing off. ‘We don’t have the votes in Congress,’ he
said . . . .”).
10. Fair Credit and Charge Card Disclosure Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-583, 102 Stat.
2960.
11. The Disclosure Act provided “for more detailed and uniform disclosures of rates and
other cost information in applications and solicitations to open credit and charge card ac-
counts. The act also required issuers to disclose pricing information, to the extent practicable
as determined by the Federal Reserve, in a tabular format. This table is also known as the
Schumer box, named for the Congressman that introduced the provision requiring this dis-
closure into legislation.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-929, CREDIT CARDS:
INCREASED COMPLEXITY IN RATES AND FEES HEIGHTENS NEED FOR MORE EFFECTIVE DISCLOSURES
TO CONSUMERS, 17 n.21 (Sept. 2006).
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Schumer believed that if credit card companies were required to
explain more—both at the card-acquisition and card-use stages—
consumers would a) be more educated, b) pick the most interest-
rate efficient cards from issuers who would now (in theory) com-
pete for users by dropping fees,12 and c) use credit cards in a more
optimal, debt-reducing fashion once they better understood how
their balances accrued. The Disclosure Act built upon the informa-
tion-centered model deployed in the Truth in Lending Act
(TILA),13 a model that discloses key contract terms to educate and
protect consumers. Schumer and others who proposed similar re-
forms simply assumed that if supply-side disclosure worked in other
contexts, it was an appropriate policy prescription for consumer
credit cards as well. But what if disclosure in this context was not an
appropriate prescription, and this logical extension of TILA was, in
fact, unhelpful or harmful to consumers?
To answer that question, this Article reexamines the history of
consumer finance disclosure lawmaking, focusing particularly on
the Disclosure Act and its legacy and then continuing to the devel-
opment of the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and
Disclosure Act of 2009 (the CARD Act)14 and the Consumer Finan-
cial Protection Bureau (the CFPB).15 Congressional credit card
policy reforms of the past twenty-five years rest on the assumption
that one-size-fits-all disclosure regimes actually educate consumers,
produce net-positive results in the marketplace, and enable con-
sumers to navigate both card acquisition and card usage more
efficiently.
12. Naturally, assumptions about the abilities of consumers to pick the cheapest or best
products are problematic for a variety of reasons. See, e.g., Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and
the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 707, 741–3 (2006).
13. Some of TILA’s basic provisions already applied to credit cards, but the Disclosure
Act significantly extended this reach. Congress has previously amended TILA, 15 U.S.C.
§1601 et seq., to focus on a variety of consumer-credit issues, but reforms prior to the Disclo-
sure Act, such as the Consumer Leasing Act of 1975 and the Truth in Lending Simplification
and Reform Act of 1980, built upon disclosure of terms as the primary regulatory device. See,
e.g., FEDERAL RESERVE, REGULATION M CONSUMER LEASING 1 (2008), available at http://www
.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/caletters/2008/0805/08-05_attachment2.pdf (describing the
CLA’s purpose as “to assure that meaningful and accurate disclosure of lease terms is pro-
vided to consumers before entering into a contract”). See, also, Consumer Leasing Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-240, § 2 90 Stat. 257, 257 (amending Section 102 of TILA, and describ-
ing the 1975 leasing reforms as helping to “assure a meaningful disclosure of the terms[,]
compare more readily[,]. . .and to assure meaningful and accurate disclosures . . . in
advertisements”).
14. See Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No.
111-24, 123 Stat. 1734.
15. The CFPB was created under Title X of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1955, 1964 (2010).
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This Article’s analysis of the evidence informing this history sug-
gests that this core assumption is false. Further, the current model
assumes a monolithic consumer—a “generic man”—would respond
to disclosure regimes and their educational function uniformly.
Congressional advocates for consumer reform made policy deci-
sions based on anecdotal evidence, which reinforced the view that
they could model a complex policy designed to educate consumers
and change their behavior on the examples of a few non-represen-
tative consumers. As the regime developed, advocates proposed
smaller, incremental reforms, each with a similar nomothetic ap-
proach to consumers and consumer behavior. This legislating style
became path-dependent, as new reforms were simply incorporated
within the same overall disclosure model—easing the cost of transi-
tion from each change but also decreasing the likelihood of a more
comprehensive remodeling of the entire regime. As described in
this Article, Congress’s initial credit card disclosure regimes were
not built upon the rigorous data analysis of policy analysts or gov-
ernment agencies nor the empirical claims or normative arguments
of law scholars and other academics.16
This Article’s analysis of various iterations of consumer credit
card law reforms and the methodologies and evidence informing
such laws suggest that generic credit card disclosures are not an
effective solution for any of the problems associated with credit
card use. Whether the problem is excessive interest rates, poor
short-term consumer choices (such as overspending), consumers’
inability to understand their long-term usage and debt manage-
ment options, or something else, consumer finance disclosure
regimes have not proven to be an effective consumer intelligence-
building tool.17 The Federal Reserve even agrees and suggests that
consumer financial education—not disclosure—is the most effec-
tive tool for influencing credit card holder outcomes.18
Nonetheless, the primary legislative focus for consumer credit card
finance law and policy was—and still is—rooted in the disclosure-
based idealism derived from TILA, which informed Schumer and
his colleagues in the late 1980s. More recent interventions, such as
the CARD Act and the CFPB, have proposed more direct regulation
of credit card issuers’ practices and called for more research in an
16. Whether the CFPB’s (eventual) large-scale data crunching proves a useful counter-
point is currently unknown.
17. In other contexts, disclosure regimes are undoubtedly valuable. As explained in Part
III.C, infra, the efficacy of financial disclosures is empirically different than other types of
disclosures; for example, prescription drugs.
18. See discussion infra note 192 (where the Federal Reserve finds that making further
changes to disclosures is “unlikely to be helpful”).
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attempt to right this ship. However, even these reforms leave the
existing disclosure-to-consumer solution regime in place.
This Article posits that lawmakers should abandon portions of
disclosure reforms modeled on a mythical generic consumer and
instead deploy both disclosure and financial education regimes that
permit, encourage, and facilitate disclosure targeted to a particular
consumer’s demographics. This change will increase the likelihood
that issuers can craft effective disclosures that are relevant to end-
users from a variety of demographic groups and will facilitate more
robust consumer-behavior research by academics and interested
policymakers, such as the CFPB. Although proponents of more re-
cent reforms have understood the limits of one-size-fits-all
disclosure, their arguments have not gone far enough in tailoring
disclosure and financial education to a consumer’s socio-demo-
graphic characteristics. Instead, more recent proposed reforms
focus on a model of personalized disclosure that does not directly
distinguish consumers based on gender, race, or other socio-demo-
graphic characteristics. This failure to distinguish between groups
could be why credit-card disclosures do not fully accomplish con-
sumer advocates’ long-term goals.
Evidence-based policymaking advocates have long focused on the
nexus between science and optimal outcomes in fields such as pub-
lic health. But Congressional scholars have argued that applying
such approaches to the legislative process may be impractical at
best and naı̈ve at worst.19 This is possibly why legal scholars framing
the disclosure debate have generally avoided applying an evidence-
based policymaking framework and have instead focused on other
key questions, such as the extent to which consumers read or do
not read disclosures or whether disclosure regimes are economi-
cally efficient methods of modifying consumer behavior.20 While
19. See DAVID MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 15 (1974); see, also, Den-
nis C. Mueller et al., Representative Government via Random Selection, 12 PUBLIC CHOICE 57
(1972). Many scholars believe that a research focus on Congress using evidence to make
good policy is more of a utopian ideal than a real solution. These scholars point to the works
of authors like Mayhew and others who suggest that Congressional members are mostly inter-
ested in re-election and career enhancement and will thus propose the most minimally
invasive regulations possible in order to secure political goodwill and capital back home.
Further, Congressional members may find greater financial support from industry if they
deflect more aggressive proposals by proposing less invasive solutions. Thus, those scholars
who share this view of policymaking find a focus on evidence to be wishful thinking. Where
some see these factors as reasons to abandon an evidence-based policymaking framework,
this framework is utilized as an ideal—one that should at least inform the policy-making
discussion.
20. See, e.g., OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT 30–32 (2012) (describing the effi-
cacy of product sellers’ attempts to educate consumers and the scholarly discourse
highlighting resulting market imperfections).
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these scholarly discussions have been rich and informative, policy-
makers have not applied the core insights from the evidence-based
policy literature to reform consumer credit card acquisition and
usage.
This Article’s contributes to the growing body of consumer fi-
nance law and policy analysis by providing the first broad
assessment of the legislative history and evidence for Congress’s
twenty-five year quest to improve consumer credit card behavior
and the outcomes of that pursuit. The evidence suggests that Con-
gress and federal regulators initially lacked a robust, scientifically
informed understanding of consumer behavior regarding key
credit card reform initiatives.21 Further, the evidence suggests that
the few models and studies of consumer behavior that advised such
reforms should have produced a functionally different regime; the
current system does not disaggregate consumers into definable
groups, which would facilitate different messaging, segmented edu-
cation, and advanced research. With respect to functionally
different regimes, international studies rely on a variety of schema
and metrics to show that consumers respond differently to various
credit and spending scenarios for various reasons, including socio-
economic and psychological factors.22 Solving for optimality while
controlling for such complexity in consumer decision-making
would require a consumer-side tailoring of both financial education
and credit card disclosure regimes, which includes—even targets—
customers based on socio-demographic variables.23 Compared to a
21. See infra note 74 and accompanying text. Evidence reviewed for this Article includes
all evidence Congress cited in hearings pertaining to various iterations of such reforms as
well as evidence directly introduced into the Congressional record. This is not to say that
Congress could have known in, say, 1968, what is now known about consumer behavior or
BLE. But, it should suggest that over time, as evidence grew, Congress’s disclosure discourse
could and should have been more enriched by evidence suggesting its sub-optimality and
pointing the way toward other, alternative, solutions.
22. See, e.g., FIN. SERV. AUTH., CONSUMER RESEARCH 42: MORTGAGE DISCLOSURE: MYSTERY
CUSTOMER RESEARCH REPORT (2005), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/consu
mer-research/crpr42.pdf; FIN. SERV. AUTH., CONSUMER RESEARCH 34: UCITS: CHARGES DIS-
CLOSURE-PRESENTING PRODUCT CHARGES TO CUSTOMERS (2005), available at http://www.fsa
.gov.uk/static/pubs/consumer-research/crpr34.pdf; Financial Services Authority; FIN. SERV.
AUTH, CONSUMER RESEARCH 44: YOUNG PEOPLE (18–24) AND THEIR FINANCIAL INFORMATION
NEEDS (2005), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/consumer-research/crpr44
.pdf.
23. See, e.g., Ariel Porat and Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Personalizing Default Rules and Disclo-
sure with Big Data, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1417, 1433–53 (2014) (describing a broad general
framework for deploying personalized default rules across a variety of commercial contexts).
While this work engages an impressive breadth, its focus on credit card disclosure rules is
limited and proposes personalized solutions that rely on conventional metrics of consumer
credit behavior (e.g. FICO scores). Instead, this Article focuses on personalized-disclosures
using observable socio-demographic characteristics that federal law presently forbids.
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generic-man approach, tailoring across multiple factors is more
likely to reach and influence consumers and to improve the efficacy
of disclosure for all end-users. However, the Equal Credit Opportu-
nity Act (the “ECOA”) currently prohibits card issuers from both
acquiring and using many consumer socio-demographic variables.24
This Article contributes to and links two previously unconnected
scholarly trajectories: those scholarly works that suggest that evi-
dence-informed policymaking can and should be the focus of
lawmakers25 and those that suggest that disclosure, as the primary
commercial law vehicle for educating consumers, produces sub-op-
timal consumer outcomes.26 The key difference between this
Article’s targeted socio-demographic personalized approach and
the approaches of such scholars such as Thaler27 and Bar-Gill28 is its
focus on the issuers’ ability to predictively and empirically tailor dis-
closures to consumers in ways that federal law currently forbids.
This approach is distinct from advocates of “smart” disclosure, who
attempt to empower consumers through disclosure of customers’
actual habits that takes into account individual consumer
demographics. Further, both smart regimes and existing generic re-
gimes—still modeled on engaging a generic consumer with further
post-use disclosure tailored to general psychological profiles—
could produce problematic outcomes for consumers who are not
part of that policy norming. Consumers think and act differently
depending on a multitude of socio-demographic variables (race
and gender, for example).29 These differences in thinking influ-
ence how people perceive financial choices and financial decision-
24. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-l691f. Among other things, the ECOA bans creditors from dis-
criminating on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, marital status, and age.
Therefore, the gathering, analysis and issuer’s and lenders’ use of this information in the
solicitation and credit-granting process is strategically avoided to prevent triggering potential
liability.
25. See generally, KAREN BOGENSCHNEIDER & THOMAS J. CORBETT, EVIDENCE-BASED POLI-
CYMAKING: INSIGHTS FROM POLICY-MINDED RESEARCHERS AND RESEARCH-MINDED POLICYMAKERS
(2010) (gathering insights from researchers and policymakers about optimal ways to gather,
use, and evaluate research and evidence during policymaking debates).
26. See generally, OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO
KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE (2014).
27. See, e.g., Richard H. Thaler and Will Tucker, Smarter Information, Smarter Consumers,
HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 2013, at 8. (describing smart disclosure as falling into four broad
categories: “(1) government release of data it collects on products and services; (2) govern-
ment release to individuals of their personal data (such as Social Security contributions and
tax returns); (3) government-facilitated electronic disclosure by private sector companies of
price or attribute data on products and services; and (4) government- facilitated release to
consumers of personal data held by the companies providing the products and services”).
28. See Oren Bar-Gill, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT, supra note 20, at 106–10 (2012).
29. See, e.g., Studies in Public Opinion: Attitudes, Nonattitudes, Measurement Error, and
Change (William E Sarisand & Paul M. Sniderman eds., 2004).
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making and should factor into financial disclosure and education
regimes. Simply providing more detailed information to a group of
imperfectly rational and heterogeneous consumers may not only be
unhelpful, it could be financially harmful.
Further, this Article questions whether the CARD Act and similar
recent reforms modeled on this mythical generic consumer will
help or harm the constituencies that the reforms claim to target.
Finally, this Article suggests that federal law permit financial institu-
tions to use customer socio-demographic information.
Part I of this Article introduces the historical backdrop of credit
card policymaking and the first major piece of disclosure-based re-
form. Part II gathers and reanalyzes the field of evidence
policymakers for major iterations of credit card finance reform
cited, analyzed, created, or otherwise utilized and then compares
the results and conclusions of such studies with the policy prescrip-
tions that emerged. Part III focuses on the CARD Act and its
continued reliance on disclosure as a consumer-education tool and
regulatory framework. Finding the evidentiary basis for continued
reliance on the existing disclosure regime still unsubstantiated, this
Article concludes by a) defining the harms the existing disclosure
regime causes, b) proposing more robust evidence-based policy
prescriptions, and c) calling for Congress to revisit laws that prevent
financial institutions from acquiring and utilizing certain socio-
demographic customer information. Reexamining this prohibition
will lead to two broad results. First, issuers could integrate evidence-
based policymaking into credit card reforms through sustained and
expanded consumer research, particularly focused on marginalized
constituencies whose behavioral norms have not previously been in-
tegrated into policy proposals. Second, rather than solely focusing
on providing consumers with more personalized information, issu-
ers and regulators could utilize socio-demographic information
about individual cardholders to both educate and inform cardhold-
ers about their consumer financial behavior and outcomes.
I. THE CREATION OF THE DISCLOSURE ACT AND ITS AFTERMATH
The existing generic-consumer credit card disclosure framework
is rooted in the well-intentioned ideals of early 1970s Congressional
reformers. The Truth In Lending Act (TILA) was the beginning
and the “crown jewel of the Disclosure Empire.”30 TILA, [“u]nlike
30. Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA.
L. REV. 647, 665 (2010).
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some disclosure regimes, . . . was actually given thought.”31 TILA
and its implementation through Regulation Z were built on a con-
sumer-friendly disclosure-based regulatory framework, as were
other federal statutes developed within a disclosure-based frame-
work.32 Many normative reasons explain the rapid deployment of
disclosure models in contracts and commercial law. Broadly, law
scholars agree that disclosure’s purpose at its best was to correct
bargaining imbalances and market failure, primarily by reducing in-
formation asymmetries, thereby improving the quality of the
contractual decisions made.33 Thus, the significance of TILA as a
consumer-friendly statute must be balanced against its role as a
model for Schumer’s eventual proposals for credit card reform.
Further, scholars would soon question the TILA model, despite its
rapid adoption by Congress as a policy norm.34 The 1980s eco-
nomic expansion led to rapid credit card usage throughout the
country,35 and by 1984 seventy-one percent of American families
had some type of credit card.36  Thus, political urgency conflicted
with effective data gathering.
Schumer’s frontal attack on the credit card industry was rooted
in his belief that issuers’ high-profit margins and higher-than-de-
sired interest rates suggested that credit card consumers were being
“ripped off.”37 Schumer’s solution to the market-maintenance of
these high interest rates was interest-rate cap legislation.38 He was
the primary sponsor of legislation directing the Federal Reserve
Board to study credit card interest rates as part of what he hoped
was the first step toward a nationwide mandatory interest-rate cap
on credit card issuers.39 To offer consumers more immediate relief,
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act,
Pub. L. No. 93-637, §§ 101-112, 88 Stat. 2183, 2183-92 (1975) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-
12 (2000)).
33. See, e.g., Larry T. Garvin, Small Business and the False Dichotomies of Contract
Law, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 295, 308–313 (2005).
34. See, e.g., CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 33 (William Whitford et al.
eds., 2003) (describing the historical background integrating disclosure with TILA and credit
card regulations and noting both that there is “little evidence that the introduction of disclo-
sure provisions has had significant impact on over-indebtedness” and that disclosure models
that failed to learn from behavioral insights about irrational consumers might be “limited” in
success).
35. David S. Evans & Joshua D. Wright, The Effect of the Consumer Financial Protection
Agency Act of 2009 on Consumer Credit, 22 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 277, 299 (2010).
36. Lewis Mandell, The Credit Card Industry: A History 153 (1990).
37. Stephen Chapman, Credit Card Fraud in Congress, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 22, 1985, at 23.
38. Low-Cost Credit Cards, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Dec. 2, 1985, at 14.
39. Id.
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Schumer ordered his staff to spend weeks calling “banks through-
out the country to compile the first list of low interest rate credit
cards.”40 Schumer mentioned the list on a morning talk show and,
as a result, claimed to have received over 40,000 letters from con-
sumers asking for a copy of the list.41 He released the list to the
public on November 19, 1985.42 As the first publicly available inter-
est rate survey of its kind, the Schumer list allowed consumers to
easily compare credit card interest rates nationwide.
However, in 1987, Schumer backed off his rate cap proposal
when an array of forces resisted his proposed legislation.43 First, too
few Congress members co-sponsored the legislation.44 Second, the
Federal Reserve Board rejected the need for rate-capping legisla-
tion, finding that “certain credit card rate cap proposals would
result in a bath of red ink for card issuers.”45 The American Bankers
Association46 and Senator Richard Shelby47 raised various concerns.
However, most Americans still supported interest rate cap legisla-
tion, even if it meant credit cards would be harder to obtain.48
Schumer’s rate-capping quest was futile49 and was only used as a
foil for law and policy scholars over the ensuing decades.50 Conse-
quently, Schumer pursued other ways to build on his previously
40. Credit Card Disclosure Acts: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of
the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong. 71 (1987) [hereinafter
Credit Hearing] (statement of Rep. Charles E. Schumer) (“In fact, 11/2 years ago, I went on
one of the morning talk shows to talk about credit cards, and I mentioned that my staff had
spent weeks up at night, calling all the banks throughout the country to compile the first list
of low interest rate credit cards. It was just mentioned on the show. We got something like
40,000 letters asking us for a copy of the list. So anyone who says consumers aren’t interested
in finding out what the interest rates are is just not telling the truth.”)
41. Id.
42. Institutions Across the Nation Offering Low Credit Card Rates, THE AMERICAN
BANKER, Nov. 19, 1985, at 8.
43. Harrigan, supra note 6.
44. Id.
45. S. REP. NO. 100-323, at 15 (1988)
46. Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, Nov. 19, 1985 (reporting that, if it passed, “there would
be a substantial reduction in the number of banks issuing cards”).
47. Credit Hearing, supra note 40, at 75 (arguing that Schumer’s plan would shrink or
curtail the accessibility of credit to so many working people that credit-strapped consumers
would “go underground to loan sharks”).
48. Id. at 29 (statement of Alan Fox, Legis. Rep. of Consumer Fed’n of Am.) (“A survey
conducted by NBC News in April, 1986 asked Americans if ‘Congress should pass legislation
limiting the amount of interest credit card companies can charge, even if that means it would be
much harder for people like you to get credit? . . . Consumers replied ‘Yes’ by a 74-20% margin.”).
49. Harrigan, supra note 6 (“Schumer [had] called for national credit-card interest rate
ceilings in the past, but this year he’s backing off. ‘We don’t have the votes in Congress,’ he
said . . . .”).
50. See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann, Charging Ahead: The Growth and Regulation of Credit
Card Markets (2006).
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successful approach of empowering credit card seekers with mar-
ket-savvy information. His revised and more limited focus led to a
form of regulatory intervention that defines his Congressional leg-
acy. His proposed solution to the market-information gap required
credit card issuers to disclose key terms in an easy-to-read tabular
format because he thought that existing disclosures were too diffi-
cult for consumers to understand.51 Schumer believed that more
disclosure would better educate consumers about the market, re-
sulting in better choices.
Schumer knew that, by the late 1980s, consumers were receiving
over 2.4 billion solicitations for credit cards, most of which did not
disclose basic cost information.52 Senate hearings related to Schu-
mer’s prior proposal found that “[t]his lack of disclosure at the
time of application or solicitation may help explain why credit card
profits remain so high despite the large number of card issuers.”53
According to Schumer, “[i]f the diagnosis [was] credit card fiction,
[then] the cure [was] easy to prescribe: increased availability of
credit card facts.”54 However, this focus on how best to educate
credit card consumers was guesswork, backed more by theory than
fact and limited by an absence of data.
This switch in Schumer’s regulatory approach—from a com-
mand-control of interest rates to a less invasive disclosure model—
relied on the assumption that disclosing information could make
credit card acquisition or use more efficient, even though disclo-
sure’s reliability as a teaching and learning tool was not clear.
Nevertheless, Schumer’s legislation, enacted as the Fair Credit and
Charge Card Disclosure Act of 1988 (the “Disclosure Act”), man-
dated the tabular format—now known as the “Schumer box”—to
display pricing information in credit card disclosures.55 By enacting
the Disclosure Act, Congress again chose disclosure as the primary
tool for regulating credit card issuers and, by not providing an alter-
native vehicle or methodology, disclosure continued to be used as
51. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-06-929, Credit Cards: Increased Complex-
ity in Rates and Fees Heightens Need for More Effective Disclosures to Consumers, 17 n.21
(Sept. 2006).
52. S. REP. NO. 100-259, at 2 (1987).
53. Id. at 3.
54. Credit Hearing, supra note 40, at 71.
55. “The Schumer box is the result of the Fair Credit and Charge Card Disclosure Act,
Pub. L. No. 100-583, 102 Stat. 2960 (1988), which amended TILA to provide for more de-
tailed and uniform disclosures of rates and other cost information in applications and
solicitations to open credit and charge card accounts. The act also required issuers to dis-
close pricing information, to the extent practicable as determined by the Federal Reserve, in
a tabular format. This table is also known as the Schumer box, named for the Congressman
that introduced the provision requiring this disclosure into legislation.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNT-
ABILITY OFFICE, supra note 11, at 17 n.21.
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the primary Congressional tool for educating credit-card
consumers.
Following the Disclosure Act’s passage, evidence from the market
suggested that it had “helped to significantly increase[ ] consumer
awareness of credit card costs.”56 Increased awareness allowed cus-
tomers to comparison shop, increasing competition among credit
card issuers.57 Increased competition created incentives for issuers
to offer more competitive interest rates, which in turn caused rates
to drop.58 According to Schumer, “[g]ood old fashioned American
competition did the job.”59 At the same time, even though credit
card issuers moderately lowered their interest rates, they still en-
joyed record profits.60 This surprising result is partially explained by
the failure of the Disclosure Act’s drafters to predict the ways in
which card issuers would modify their practices to fit the letter of
the law, if not its spirit, in order to find additional consumer profit
centers. While the Disclosure Act specified certain disclosures, it
did not regulate an array of other matters, including interest rates,
pricing structures, and various types of solicitations. Further, Schu-
mer and other advocates of this legislation underestimated the
expansion of supply at the same time they overestimated their influ-
ence on shaping consumer demand.
Thus, while Schumer’s strategy was well intentioned, card issuers
found various ways to circumvent the Act’s objectives. The Disclo-
sure Act indirectly led to the more widespread use of teaser rates,
promotional rates, and a variety of other customer inducements
and incentives—along with an array of fees and penalties that Schu-
mer and other champions of the Disclosure Act did not foresee.61
Card issuers could follow the requirements of the Disclosure Act by
developing and disclosing low interest rates only at the opening of
56. Id. at 17.
57. See Modernizing Consumer Protection in the Financial Regulatory System:
Strengthening Credit Card Protections: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 8 (2009) [hereinafter Consumer Protection Hearing] (state-
ment of Rep. Charles E. Schumer).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Credit Hearing, supra note 40, at 76. But, of course, multiple factors, including Fed-
eral Funds rate movements, influenced the declining rates, so it is unclear to what extent the
Disclosure Act influenced that result. It is possible that the Disclosure Act actually caused an
increase in rates, but the drop in the Federal Funds rate provided a greater downward pres-
sure. In short, there is no easy way to know, suggesting that there is no evidence either way as
to whether the Disclosure Act worked as a market-pressuring tool.
61. These sorts of maneuvers would be the logical consequence of credit card issuers
recognizing how their consumers behave and/or misperceive disclosure and structuring
products accordingly. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT 2 (2013) (“Put bluntly,
competition forces sellers to exploit the biases and misperceptions of their customers.”).
FALL 2014] Opening Schumer’s Box 71
the account. After this initial period, they could then raise the rates
to a market-supporting level.62 In addition, issuers whose margins
the Disclosure Act had limited could also incorporate a myriad of
other “rates and fees”63 to make “credit cards appear to be much
cheaper than they actually” were.64 While some issuers met the let-
ter and intent of the Disclosure Act, many others exploited
loopholes to maximize fees and revenues.65
At the same time that issuers were assessing the limits of the Dis-
closure Act’s reach, they were also increasing access to credit to
consumers who were new to the market. The combination of the
growth in securitization and market competition that the Disclo-
sure Act partially enabled led to a rise in consumer solicitations.
The increased solicitations resulted in the predictable responses
among advocates and opponents of credit card utilization.66 Oppo-
nents suggested that credit card issuers were “pumping out
solicitations in . . . search [of] new people to get [into] debt.”67
Over five billion solicitations were being sent to American homes
annually during the early 2000’s, nearly twice the number roughly a
62. This is an example of an unintended outcome for Schumer and proponents of dis-
closure, but it is certainly possible that a more robust evidence-based policymaking process
would have anticipated this result and pro-actively foreclosed it. For example, if leading aca-
demics (or even issuers for that matter) had been asked how they might still find ways to
maximize acquisition while still enabling higher rates, it seems obvious (at least in hindsight)
that this approach could happen.
63. Credit cards now have “annual fees, merchant fees, teaser interest rates, purchase
interest rates, balance transfer interest rates, cash advance interest rates, overdraft advance
interest rates, default or penalty interest rates, late fees, over-limit fees, balance transfer fees,
cash advance fees, international transaction fees, telephone payment fees, and probably sev-
eral other fees.” Consumer Protection Hearing, supra note 57, at 10 (2009) (statement of
Adam J. Levitin, Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center).
64. Id.
65. For example, Providian Bank decided to locate its payment-processing office in New
Hampshire—where it took the longest on average for a letter to be mailed from any point in
the country—in an effort to maximize late fee revenue. When that did not trigger enough
late fees, Providian tampered with bar codes on its payment envelopes so payments would
never reach the payment-processing center in New Hampshire. Providian’s example, while
not the norm, served to harm other issuers because future regulation of these and other
practices was premised on the rogue bad faith actions of just a few issuers like Providian. Id.
at 14 (statement of James C. Sturdevant, Principal, The Sturdevant Law Firm).
66. See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and the “Sweat Box” of Credit Card Debt,
2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 375, 375-76. (2007) (describing the sweeping tide of reform of the early
2000s, concluding that the “most important effect will be to facilitate the credit card lending
business model, by slowing the time of inevitable filings by the deeply distressed and allowing
issuers to earn greater revenues from those individuals.”).
67. Regulatory Requirements and Industry Practices of Credit Card Issuers: Hearing
Before the Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. 45 (2005) [herein-
after Regulatory Requirements and Industry Practices Hearing] (statement of Sen.
Christopher J. Dodd).
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decade prior.68 Advocates suggested that competition in the credit
card market was fierce, and that this renewed competition in a free
market was good as it “lowers costs for consumers.”69 Those who saw
the need for different—or better—regulation, pointed to evidence
that “the tremendous expansion and increase of credit card interest
rates and fees [had] precipitated an unprecedented growth of con-
sumer bankruptcies.70 Various studies from this period also
suggested that rising consumer debt, specifically credit card debt,
was the primary cause of consumer bankruptcy.71 In fact, revolving
credit (as a portion of non-mortgage consumer credit) had more
than doubled in the previous decades.72 This increase was in part
because credit had become easier to obtain and use, even if con-
sumers did not understand how to acquire and use credit
efficiently.73
II. CREDIT CARD DISCLOSURE POLICY: EVIDENCE AND EFFICACY
(2000-2008)
Congress did respond to efforts to circumvent both the spirit and
letter of the Disclosure Act, but it did so without the type of rigor-
ous evidence-based policymaking expected in an area dependent
on data analysis. If Congress’s evidence was faulty, what might its
reforms have looked like? If the evidence had been sound, what
would the optimal result have been? Though many scholars have
studied the problems of disclosure as a regulatory strategy, no work
has thoroughly examined the actual development of the next new
piece of legislation addressing credit cards. To this end, I searched
the Congressional Record for a ten-year span to identify all of the
“evidence” influencing later legislation.74 The only direct way to
68. Id.
69. Id.; see generally Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373 (2004).
70. Regulatory Requirements and Industry Practices Hearing, supra note 67 (statement
of Robert D. Manning, University Professor and Special Assistant to the Provost, Rochester
Institute of Technology).
71. See Michelle J. White, Bankruptcy Reform and Credit Cards, 21 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES
175, 178–79 (2007) (gathering studies).
72. Id. at 181.
73. There are a number of potential explanations for this phenomenon, but the general
trajectory is clear. Between 1970–1998, the proportion of U.S. households having at least one
bank credit card rose from sixteen to sixty-eight percent. See THOMAS DURKIN “CREDIT CARDS:
USE AND CONSUMER ATTITUDES, 1970–2000.” FEDERAL RESERVE BULLETIN, September 2000, pp.
625.
74. To quantify and qualify the scope of evidence and the intersection of such evidence
with behavioral theories of disclosure efficacy, the Congressional Record for the ten year
span 2000–2010 was searched and evaluated for key terms: among them “TILA,” “credit
cards,” “disclosure,” and “consumers” and then examined for evidence lawmakers cited or
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evaluate the credibility of such reforms is to examine the evidence
that legislators requested or cited. As this Section demonstrates, the
“evidence” available to Congress consisted entirely of anecdotes
and studies of questionable methodology. The evidence used to jus-
tify the proposed reforms is the focus of the following Sub-Sections.
A. The Political Backdrop to Policy Reform
Congressional efforts to reform the bankruptcy system during
the period of 2000-2005 were the political backdrop to credit card
policy reform. Though the resulting legislation, the Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (the
“BAPCPA”), didn’t directly address credit card debt, the Senate’s
continued concern with credit card debt led it to study the effective-
ness of the Disclosure Act. This sub-section examines that effort.
By 2005, “it was the best time in history to be in the credit card
business.”75 Credit card issuers were making more money than ever
before.76 However, critics charged that the credit card market was
“not working for millions of Americans who [found] themselves on
the wrong end of a credit card deal.”77 More simply, “the credit
card market [was] broken” and “the average credit card agreement
[had] gone from about a page long in 1980 to more than [thirty]
pages long.”78 According to then-Professor Elizabeth Warren, the
market’s dysfunction was due to a shift in credit card agreements
that reflected a business model that had “changed from its earlier
simple roots.”79 Issuers responded that regulatory regimes like the
Disclosure Act caused the growth in complicated disclosures and
that the market for consumer options was actually quite robust.
The connection between changing consumer bankruptcy laws
and any subsequent effect on credit card acquisition and efficiency
committee reports discussed. Citations to outside evidence were reviewed, and any evidence
either a committee or a legislator cited as proof of a reform’s viability or efficacy was gath-
ered. Then, such evidence, such as Federal Reserve studies, GAO analyses, or white papers,
was examined and compared to the citation to determine the link, if any, between statements
and such evidence.
75. Regulatory Requirements and Industry Practices Hearing, supra note 67, at 44 (state-
ment of Sen. Christopher J. Dodd).
76. Id. at 19.
77. Examining the Billing, Marketing, and Disclosure Practices of the Credit Card In-
dustry, and their impact on Consumers: Hearing Before the Comm. on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 18 (2007) [hereinafter Billing, Marketing, and Disclosure
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was not empirically clear. Yet scholars suggested that issuers stood
to gain from BAPCPA’s reforms because heavily indebted consum-
ers now took longer to file bankruptcy and continued to pay
increased credit card fees in the meantime.80 As a result, Congress
had an opportunity to analyze the consequences of bankruptcy re-
form and simultaneously revisit credit card laws. For example,
responding to BAPCPA, credit card issuers expanded the supply of
credit, which coupled with heightened barriers to accessing bank-
ruptcy and caused severe financial distress to the least sophisticated
credit card holders.81 Critics of bankruptcy reform argued that
BAPCPA lacked substantive consumer protection reform and that
such protection deserved immediate consideration and
implementation.82
As a result of political compromises shaped during debates over
bankruptcy reform, the Republican-led Senate agreed to convene a
series of hearings about potential credit card reforms.83 In March
2005, Chairman Shelby held a hearing to “consider the nature of
the existing legal framework, [that] is the body of laws and regula-
tions, which govern credit card issuer and consumer interaction.”84
Senator Feinstein and others, who had opposed bankruptcy reform
while championing credit card reform, argued that the recently
signed BAPCPA made it “easier for credit card companies to send
out solicitations, but it [did] nothing to provide the kind of infor-
mation that a minimum payer really should know when they make a
minimum payment.”85 During that time, the average monthly
household charge had expanded to $1,100,86 compared to only
$125 in 1970.87 By 2005, there were 700 million credit cards in the
United States, or five credit cards per household.88 However, as
Congress turned toward directly revisiting the Disclosure Act, credit
card policy, and regulatory frameworks surrounding efficient card
acquisition and use, it did not acquire sufficient evidence about
consumer behavior in the market generally and in particular with
80. See, e.g., Mann, supra note 66 at 379.
81. White, supra note 71, at 189.
82. See Regulatory Requirements and Industry Practices of Credit Card Issuers: Hearing Before the
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. 51 (2005) (Prepared Statement of
Sen. Daniel K. Akaka).
83. Remarks on Signing the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005,
109th Cong. at 641–42 (2005) at 3 (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein) (“You said you
would hold this hearing when the bankruptcy bill was on the floor, and you have held it.”).
84. Id. at 1 (statement of Richard C. Shelby, Chairman, Comm. on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs).
85. Id. at 5 (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein).
86. Bar-Gill, supra note 69, at 1384.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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respect to disclosure. The following evidence, gathered from a re-
view of the complete Congressional record during this time span,
proved a problematic basis for future reforms.
B. Anecdotal Evidence: The Tale of Wesley Wannemacher
The first piece of evidence on which Congress relied in examin-
ing credit card debt in the 21st century was the sad story of one
man’s credit card catastrophe. The appeal of anecdotal evidence
with respect to credit card reform is clear. Legislators live amid de-
mands for action.89 “ ‘Trouble stories’—tales of someone’s
misfortune that might represent a systematic problem”90 often in-
spire these demands. “Indignation, political pressure, and a sense
of duty” to try to prevent the story from recurring frequently drive
legislators.91 The “defrauded consumer is conspicuous; the people
who can be saved by suppressed research, or the consumers who
pay for regulation remain anonymous.”92 The story of the swindled
consumer evokes “sympathy and anger”93—strong emotions that
“politically charge[ ]” an issue and make it a time-sensitive
concern.94
The danger with using anecdotes to effectuate reform is two-fold:
1) it encourages extremes from both ideological vantage points to
baseline reforms (or opposition to reforms) on non-representative
samples and 2) anecdotes represent a particularly inefficient empir-
ical baseline on which to model the expected effect of legislative
reforms on consumer outcomes.95 Given the particular importance
of gathering evidence for such an impactful reform, Congress
89. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 30, at 679.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 680.
92. Id. at 681.
93. Id. at 679–80.
94. See id. at 681. This rapid response to one notable galvanizing incident may be part of
a larger phenomenon of legislating by anecdote. See Theresa Glennon, Choosing One: Resolv-
ing The Epidemic of Multiples in Assisted Reproduction, 55 VILL. L. REV. 147, 149 n.13 (2010)
(“Legislative responses to highly unusual but extremely salient events often address issues of
immediate public concern but typically ignore larger or more common structural issues.”);
see also Kimberly McLarin, Trenton Races to Pass Bill on Sex Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1994, at
B2, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1994/08/30/nyregion/trenton-races-to-pass-bills-
on-sex-abuse.html (discussing the New Jersey Assembly’s “rush[ ]” to pass seven sex abuse
bills in the aftermath of the death of Megan Kanka, a seven-year-old child who was killed by a
twice-convicted sex offender).
95. The practice of legislating by anecdote is both a liberal (Wesley Wannemacher) and
conservative (‘welfare queen’) issue and likely has high empirical costs.
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should have, at a minimum, gathered broad statistical data of a vari-
ety of types to begin efforts to normalize a set of policy reforms.
Instead, Congress chose the path of least resistance—soliciting indi-
vidual anecdotes that were not necessarily typical of an average
consumer’s problems with existing laws and market practices.
In an early attempt to use anecdotal evidence to frame the poli-
cymaking process for further reform, Senator Carl Levin invited
credit card consumer Wesley Wannemacher of Lima, Ohio to testify
at a congressional hearing titled Credit Card Practices: Fees, Interest
Charges, and Grace Periods.96 Wannemacher had contacted Levin af-
ter reading a news article encouraging those who had “paid
excessive [credit card] fees and charges” to contact Levin’s office.97
According to the article, Senator Levin had a desire “to look into
cases like [Wesley’s].”98 Wannemacher agreed to tell his credit card
trouble story for all the “swindled American consumers”99 out
there.100
Wannemacher testified that he had obtained a new credit card in
2001 to pay for wedding expenses.101 Shortly after receiving the
card, Wannemacher reached and exceeded his credit limit of
$3,000 by paying for just flowers and a photographer, the total costs
of which were $3,200.102 Nothing else was ever charged on the
card.103 Between 2001 and 2007, Wannemacher made an honest ef-
fort to repay his debt, “averaging payments of about $1,000 a
year.”104 Yet, after paying “about $6,300 on his $3,200 debt,” his Feb-
ruary 2007 billing statement indicated that he still owed $4,400.105
96. Credit Card Practices: Fees, Interest Charges, and Grace Periods: Hearing Before
the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Comm. on Homeland Security and Gov-
ernmental Affairs, 110th Cong. 14 (2007) [hereinafter Fees, Interest Charges, and Grace
Periods Hearing] (statement of Wesley Wannemacher, Consumer, Lima, Ohio).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See generally Regulatory Requirements and Industry Practices Hearing, supra note 67,
at 5 (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein) (“An Ohio resident who tried for 6 years to pay off
a $1,900 balance on her Discover card, sending the credit company a total of $3,492 in
monthly payments from 1997 to 2003, yet her balance grew to $5,357. A Virginia resident
who had a Providian Visa bill increased to $5,357, even though they used the card for only
$218 in purchases and made monthly payments totaling $3,058. And an individual from my
State, California, who actually worked a second job to keep up with the $2,000 in monthly
payments she collectively sent to five banks to try to repay $25,000 in credit card debt. Even
though she had not used the cards to buy anything more, her debt had doubled to $49,574
by the time she filed for bankruptcy.”).
100. See Fees, Interest Charges, and Grace Periods Hearing, supra note 96, at 14 (state-




104. Id. at 2 (statement of Sen. Carl Levin).
105. Fees, Interest Charges, and Grace Periods Hearing, supra note 96.
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At the hearing, Senator Levin asked the Committee: “how is it possi-
ble that a man pays $6,300 on a $3,200 credit card debt, but still
owes $4,400?”106 On top of his $3,200 debt, Wannemacher was
charged about $4,900 in interest, $1,100 in late fees, and $1,500 in
over-the-limit fees.107 By going no more than $200 over his credit
limit only three times, Wannemacher was “hit 47 times with over-
the-limit fees,” amounting to $1,500.108 In total, “these fees and the
interest charges added up to $7,500 which, on top of the original
$3,200 credit card debt, produced total charges of $10,700.”109 Al-
though Wannemacher didn’t blame “the credit card issuers for
putting [him] into debt, [he did] blame them for keeping [him]
there.”110 The story was a moving call to action, but it was just a
singular example. No attempts were made to ensure that Wan-
nemacher’s story was representative of the “average” consumer or
to balance his story with others’ positive stories.
Therefore, the record is silent as to why Wannemacher’s story
was the focus of these hearings, as opposed to the analysis of ex-
isting countrywide data or other broad data trends divorced from
anecdote. Was Wannemacher a typical cardholder? Did his story re-
present an example of the failure of the Disclosure Act or the
failure of a card issuer to follow its terms? Did it show that rate
capping would now be a good policy solution? Or, was his story sim-
ply good countervailing political theater to balance the debate after
enactment of the BAPCPA where voices like Wannemacher’s were
absent? Whatever the intended effect of his testimony, one person’s
example, divorced from the context of millions of other account-
holders, should not constitute the basis for policy reform. However,
as Sections II.C–II.E describe, the non-narrative evidence before
Congress was not necessarily more compelling.
C. GAO Study: Failure of Methodology
During the period of the original BAPCPA debates, Congress re-
quested that the Government Accountability Office (GAO) review a
number of issues related to credit card fees and practices, includ-
ing, among other things,111 “how effectively the issuers disclose the
106. Id. at 1.




111. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 11, at 12 (“This report discusses (1)
how the interest, fees, and other practices that affect the pricing structure of cards from the
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pricing structures of cards to their cardholders.”112 The GAO re-
leased its findings on the adequacy of current credit card
disclosures in 2006 and offered recommendations for future
legislation.
To determine the effectiveness of credit card disclosures, the
GAO contracted with UserWorks, Inc.,113 a private usability-consult-
ing firm.114 The UserWorks usability consultant “conducted three
separate evaluations of a sample of disclosure materials” from four
major credit card issuers.115 First, the usability consultant conducted
a readability assessment using “computer-facilitated formulas to
predict the grade level required to understand the materials.”116
Second, the consultant conducted “an heuristic evaluation”117 to as-
sess how well the disclosures adhered to “industry best practices.”118
Finally, the consultant tested twelve consumers119 to determine
“how well actual consumers were able to use the documents to iden-
tify and understand information about card fees and other
practices.”120 Ultimately, UserWorks identified various problematic
practices121 in credit card disclosures “that reduced their usefulness
to consumers.”122
largest U.S. issuers have evolved and cardholders’ experiences under these pricing structures
in recent years; (2) how effectively the issuers disclose the pricing structures of cards to their
cardholders; (3) whether credit card debt and penalty interest and fees contribute to card-
holder bankruptcies; and (4) the extent to which penalty interest fees contribute to the
revenues and profitability of issuers’ credit card operations.”).
112. Id. at 82.
113. UserWorks, Inc. is located in the metropolitan Washington, DC area and “offers a
wide range of services, including user interface design support, usability evaluations, and
accessibil[i]ty evaluation services for both hardware and software products. [UserWorks]
help[s] organizations design and test products, assist[s] them in developing their own usabil-
ity and accessibility capabilities, and provide[s] both fixed and portable lab facilities on a
rental basis.” USERWORKS, http://www.userworks.com/default.asp?page=services&sub (last
visited Jan. 1, 2013).
114. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 11, at 82.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 83 (“Readability formulas measure the elements of writing that can be sub-
jected to mathematical calculation, such as average number of syllables in words or numbers
of words in sentences in the text.”).
117. Id.
118. Id. (“In the absence of best practices specifically applicable to credit card disclo-
sures, the consultant used guidelines from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s
1998 guidebook Plain English Handbook: How to Create Clear SEC Disclosure Documents.”).
119. Id. at 83 n.2 (“According to the consultant, testing with small numbers of individuals
can generally identify many of the problems that can affect the readability and usability of
materials.”); see also id. at 83 (“To ensure sample diversity, the participants were selected to
represent the demographics of the U.S. adult population in terms of education, income, and
age.”).
120. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 11, at 83.
121. See generally, id. at 36–55.
122. Id. at 36.
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The UserWorks study indicated that disclosures were “written at a
[reading] level too high for the average individual to under-
stand.”123 The average disclosure was written at an eleventh-grade
reading level,124 and “nearly half of the U.S. population reads at or
below the eighth-grade level.”125 Furthermore, comprehending sev-
eral parts of the disclosure documents required a minimum of a
“fifteenth-grade education.”126 Still, most solicitation letters “re-
quired only a seventh- and eighth-grade reading level,”127 most
likely because solicitation letters “included more information in a
tabular format than card member agreements.”128 A single consult-
ant then used “knowledge of plain language, publications design
guidelines, and industry best practices”129 to identify design aspects
that “could cause consumers using them to encounter problems.”130
More specifically, large amounts of information typically presented
in the Schumer box were not grouped appropriately and “compro-
mised the benefits of using a tabular format.”131 The usability
consultant opined that this could “distract readers from more im-
portant messages.”132 Disclosure documents contained too much
detail and used “unfamiliar or complex terms to describe simple
concepts.”133 One card member agreement used the phrase “rolling
consecutive twelve month billing cycle,” instead of saying “over the
course of the next 12 billing statements” or “next 12 months.”134
Lastly, the consultant noted that most of the samples did not use
favorable presentation techniques.135
The UserWorks study was severely flawed. First, the study began
with a thrice-reviewed analysis of the disclosure literature of only
four issuers.136 At the time, there were roughly 800 card issuers
throughout the entire world and at least several hundred in the
123. Id. at 37.
124. Id. at 38 (“fifteenth-grade education . . . is the equivalent of 3 years of college
education”).
125. Id. (according to a “1992 National Adult Literacy Survey” “cited by the usability
consultant”).
126. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 11, at 38.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 39.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 11, at 43.
133. Id. at 46.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. It is not clear how these particular four issuing banks were chosen or whether their
disclosures were normed within an existing model that was universal to all issuers. For exam-
ple, if Bank A and Bank B, both VISA issuers, issued identical disclosures because VISA
mandated as such, then this difference might not matter. But, if issuing banks or credit-
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United States.137 To sample less than one percent of all available
disclosures as a norming device is not empirically justified unless
the same issuer or bank wrote or designed all disclosures—some-
thing that did not seem true.138 Second, the usability consultant
evaluated the Schumer box separate from its deployment to actual
consumers, without evaluating its use in the context of an actual
solicitation or bill. Third, following both assessments, the company
sampled a total of twelve consumers to evaluate the experiences of
actual consumers. It then embedded the observations of those
twelve consumers into its report and announced its prescriptions
aligned with the consumer evidence. Typical survey-data analysis in
political polling generally seeks slightly over 1,000 participants in
order to secure a reasonable margin of error of plus or minus 2.5%
regarding the extrapolation of sample data observations across rela-
tively simple topics compared to the actual “real” opinion about
such topics across an entire population. While there is not a univer-
sally agreed-upon minimum level of survey or sampling data to
assess the cognitive impact of consumer disclosures, it seems clear
that the disclosure regime mandate for 150 million cardholders
should be based on research involving more than twelve individu-
als. Therefore, while the UserWorks study might constitute
evidence in the loosest sense, it falls below an acceptable standard
for a reform of this type—or any reform, for that matter.
The GAO may have had its own doubts about the UserWorks
study because it later hired a different consultant to do essentially
the same thing. This consulting firm was tasked with creating an
evidentiary record by a statistically supported sampling method—
gathering a random sample of consumers that would allow for rea-
sonable extrapolation of the sample’s findings to the general public
at large. But this study was also flawed.139 The study’s goal was to lay
the empirical foundation for a broad, generalized analysis of con-
sumer-acquisition, use, and understanding of credit card terms in
order to understand the then-present need for policy reform. For
unions were able to craft bank-specific disclosures, then this sample would be highly
problematic.
137. See THE NILSON REPORT, SPECIAL REPORT: LARGEST PAYMENT CARD ISSUERS AND
MERCHANT ACQUIRERS (2014), available at http://www.nilsonreport.com/publication_special
_report.php and http://www.cartera.com/newsevents/pdf/_978[1].pdf (The issuer ranked
one hundred in the U.S. has more than $80 million in receivables).
138. It is not clear what percentage of the overall market these issuers captured or what
issuers’ agreements were used in the study.
139. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 11, at 83.
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this additional study, the GAO contracted with OneWorld Commu-
nications,140 a market research organization, “to recruit a sample of
cardholders that generally resembled the demographic makeup of
the U.S. population in terms of age, education levels, and in-
come.”141 OneWorld “gathered information about the cardholders’
knowledge of credit card terms and conditions and assessed card-
holders’ use of card disclosure materials by asking them a number
of open- and closed-ended questions.”142
The GAO intended OneWorld’s research to be a more scientifi-
cally valid assessment of the state of the field; yet, these efforts were
not successful. First, rather than recruiting and deploying a conven-
tional sample, OneWorld conducted in-depth, structured interviews
with a total of 112 adult cardholders.143 To achieve a scientifically
valid sample of the entire U.S. population, OneWorld would have
needed to gather individuals from a variety of predictable socio-
demographics (e.g. gender, race, age) as well as regional
demographics (e.g., from various parts of the United States and dif-
ferent income and employment sectors). OneWorld did not gather
the minimum numbers required for differentiating any of these
groups; thus, they admitted “the cardholders recruited for the in-
terviews did not form a random, statistically representative sample
of the U.S. population and therefore cannot be generalized to the
population of all U.S. cardholders.”144 Because OneWorld’s sample
did not include a representative pool of cardholders, its recommen-
dations were not useful for creating a nationally deployed model
based on a broad understanding of typical card-user behavior. And
since the primary goal of its research was precisely to test a “neu-
tral” cardholder response to various disclosure reforms, OneWorld
was unable to tell the GAO, and by extension Congress, what about
existing card disclosure—if anything—needed to change.
The above studies were the only two empirical analyses solicited
and utilized for the GAO’s report. The GAO nonetheless con-
cluded that reforms to the Disclosure Act’s mandate were needed.
140. “OneWorld Communications is a small San Francisco public relations company that
provides public relations advice, marketing[,] and promotional materials.” OneWorld Com-
munications, SOURCEWATCH, http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=OneWorld_Com
munication (last updated Dec. 23, 2007).
141. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 11, at 83–84 (In addition,
“[c]ardholders had to speak English, have owned at least one general-purpose credit card for
a minimum of 12 months, and have not participated in more than one focus group or similar
in-person study in the 12 months prior to the interview.”).
142. Id. at 84.
143. Id. at 83.
144. Id. at 84.
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The GAO concluded that “[t]he expansion and increased complex-
ity of card rates, fees, and issuer practices has heightened the need
for consumers to receive clear disclosures that allow them to more
easily understand the costs of using cards.”145 The GAO then rec-
ommended that the Federal Reserve Board ensure “that such
disclosures, including model forms and formatting requirements,
more clearly emphasize those terms that can significantly affect
cardholder costs, such as the actions that can cause default or other
penalty pricing rates to be imposed.”146 Ultimately, more effective
disclosures should be “simpler [and] better organized [with] de-
signs and formats that compl[ied] with best practices and industry
standards for readability and usability.”147
The GAO studies further embedded disclosure as the primary
solution and proposed a re-examining of its use as a method of im-
proving consumer outcomes.148 But these studies were not
representative of the average consumer’s experience, and they ac-
knowledged as such. The GAO could have deployed a more
rigorous national sample, found more rigorous outside research
partners, or used a variety of other schema to validate its recom-
mendations. In the absence of any scientifically valid evidence, the
GAO’s push for various disclosure-based changes is difficult to ex-
plain. This push is an example of the disconnect between a)
scientific evidence of consumer credit card behavior and b) the
drive toward further disclosure-based regimes as a solution for the
perceived shortcomings of consumer credit card behavior.
D. The Federal Reserve Board’s Ambiguous Evidence
Given the GAO’s unsuccessful efforts, Congress still needed some
evidentiary support for its nascent policy reforms. At the same time
of the GAO’s efforts, the Federal Reserve Board, nearly twenty years
after its last comprehensive disclosure review,149 began plans to con-
duct “a comprehensive review of the federally mandated disclosures
provided to credit card and other open-end credit consumers.”150
The goal of the Fed’s review was to “improve the effectiveness and
145. Id. at 77–78 (“[P]art of the reason that current disclosure materials may be less effec-
tive is that they were designed in an era when card rates and terms were less complex.”).
146. Id. at 79.
147. Id. at 78.
148. As explained infra note 192, the Federal Reserve ultimately engaged in this research
and found “improving disclosure” to be a problematic goal.
149. Mark Furletti, Payment Cards Center, Fed. Res. Bank of Phila, Federal Consumer
Protection Regulation: Disclosures and Beyond, Conference Summary 12 (2005).
150. Id. at 4.
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usefulness” of credit card disclosures.151 The Fed would have to
“arm themselves with . . . information” and focus on the TILA’s
fundamental principles.152 Card issuers believed that the Fed’s lack
of specificity was the result of minimal Congressional effort and a
lack of sustained research, with one joking that the Schumer box
was “probably developed on a budget of just a few hundred dol-
lars.”153 This skepticism of the empirics and research methodology
behind the Schumer box suggested that it was not the sort of con-
sumer data-driven and evidence-based approach that card issuers
were already using to achieve more optimal issuer-side results.
The Fed’s study was initially rooted in an anecdotal policy round-
table approach to a complicated subject; it requested “feedback on
the disclosure requirements from all those with an interest in re-
volving credit products.”154 To inform the debate, the Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia hosted a one-day symposium entitled
“Federal Consumer Protection Regulation: Disclosures and Be-
yond.”155 The symposium debate revolved around two basic
questions:156 how could “regulators and policymakers improve the
current set of regulatory disclosures,”157 and “[w]hat other tools
should regulators and policymakers consider using to protect con-
sumers?”158 Stakeholders in the debate frankly acknowledged that
little “empirical work had been done with respect to credit card
disclosure, and the literature [on the subject was] nearly nonexis-
tent.”159 The day’s discussion produced four recommendations.
First, disclosures needed to improve because they contained too
much information, making them less informative.160 Despite overall
consensus on design and some consensus on timing, participants
could not agree on which specific terms to include in the Schumer
box.161 Second, the Board needed to use market-based evidence to
“improve the process by which disclosures are created and re-
vised.”162 Third, the Board needed to use technology to “improve
151. Id.
152. Id. at 16.
153. Id. at 10 (quoting Scott Hildebrand, Vice President of marketing, Capitol One).
154. Furletti, supra note 149, at 6.
155. Id. at 4. (“The one-day event brought together economists, legal scholars, [credit
card industry leaders], consumer advocates, and federal regulators to discuss the merits of
standardized consumer credit disclosures and other tools that federal regulators use to pro-
tect credit card consumers.”).
156. Id. at 7.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 16.
160. Furletti, supra note 149, at 7.
161. Id. at 7–11.
162. Id. at 10.
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the accessibility and reliability of disclosures and to educate con-
sumers about the use of credit.”163 The last, polarizing
recommendation was that Congress should “change the current
‘mix’ of card industry regulation, modifying the extent to which
disclosure requirements, self-regulation, market-based regulation,
direct regulation, and agency-based regulation are used.”164 How-
ever, issuers opposed that recommendation and “favored a more
market driven approach, in part, because they believe most con-
sumers understand the intricacies of credit card pricing and are
capable of finding good deals on their own.”165
At the time, legal scholars argued that existing evidence did not
support the Fed’s existing framework. Todd Zywicki, a George Ma-
son University law professor, who was a leading advocate of the
BAPCPA, argued that “[w]ithout a coherent theory of the credit
card market and the market failure [the Board was] seeking to
cure, how [does one] know whether TILA’s regulatory interven-
tion . . . actually work[s]?”166 Thomas Durkin, a senior economist at
the Board of Governors, suggested that TILA’s thirty-eight different
underlying policy goals would lead to legislative incoherence and
would not produce a regime that would efficiently lead consumers
to choose the right methods for acquiring and optimally using
credit cards.167 Zywicki and Durkin’s comments thus could have set
the stage for Congress—and agencies tasked with evidence gather-
ing—to become more rigorous and thorough in their empirical
approach. In addition, these agencies could have begun to consider
the heterogeneity of both the existing law’s competing goals as well
as heterogeneity and imperfect rationality in the market of credit
card consumers. Perhaps in response to these concerns, more rigor-
ous attempts were made to gather more sophisticated evidence.
Unfortunately, these attempts also fell short.
163. Id. at 12.
164. Id. at 13.
165. Id. at 14 (“ ‘Our models consistently show that consumers are sophisticated,’ ex-
plained one issuer representative. ‘They know when to transfer their balances; they figure out
how to ensure favorable payment allocations; and they respond to rebate and reward ceil-
ings.’ ”).
166. Furletti, supra note 149, at 14.
167. Id. at 7 (“Cited goals include enhancing card market competition, enabling consum-
ers to decide between using credit and delaying consumption, and enhancing the stability of
the overall economy. ‘Because the act is perceived to have so many goals,’ Durkin remarked,
‘some people will say the act has worked and others will say it has not. Depending on how you
define success, both can be right.’ ”).
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E. The Fed’s Follow-Up Study: Design and Testing of Effective Disclosures
Two years after the Fed announced its plans for disclosure re-
view, and the forum described above, it sought empirical baselines
for reform and hired Macro International Inc. (“Macro”)168 to con-
duct consumer testing and design improved credit card
disclosures.169 The review’s goal170 was “to ensure that the regula-
tions lead to disclosures that consumers would most likely to pay
attention to, understand and comprehend, and be able to use in
their decision-making.”171
Macro’s study methodology was straightforward, but flawed.
Working with a statistically generalizable sample of 1,022 partici-
pants in seven major cities, Macro conducted eight rounds of
cognitive interviews, four rounds of focus groups, and one “mall
intercept”172 study.173 Focus group and cognitive interview partici-
pants “were recruited by telephone using a structured screening
instrument . . . designed to ensure the selection of a range of
168. Since the Fed study, Macro International has sold its business to the Opinion Re-
search Corporation. Prior to its sale, “Macro International was a privately held company that
had approximately $60 million in annual revenues. Most of its business was derived from
performing research and evaluation services in connection with a wide variety of social ser-
vices programs funded by the Federal Government. The company was one of the few major
players performing these services within the Government niche. Macro also performed mar-
ket research for private sector clients in the financial, telecommunications and consumer
products vertical markets.” Macro International, OUTCOME CAPITAL, http://www.wwccapital
.com/transactions_macro/ (last visited Aug. 11, 2014).
169. Macro International, Design and Testing of Effective Truth in Lending Disclosures 1
(2007) [hereinafter Design and Testing of Effective Truth in Lending Disclosures].
170. The goal of review announced in 2004 was to “improve the effectiveness and useful-
ness” of credit card disclosures. Furletti, supra note 149, at 4.
171. Design and Testing of Effective Truth in Lending Disclosures, supra note 169, at 1.
172. Id. at i.; Macro International, Design and Testing of Effective Truth in Lending Dis-
closures: Findings from Experimental Study 1 (2008) [hereinafter Findings from
Experimental Study]. “A mall-intercept is a survey whereby respondents are intercepted in
shopping in malls. The process involves stopping the shoppers, screening them for appropri-
ateness, and either administering the survey on the spot or inviting them to a research facility
located in the mall to complete the interview. While not representative of the population in
general, shopping mall customers do constitute a major share of the market for many prod-
ucts.” Mall Intercept, Survey Analytics, http://www.surveyanalytics.com/mall-intercept-method
.html (last visited Aug. 11, 2014).
173. See Design and Testing of Effective Truth in Lending Disclosures, supra note 169, at
1; Macro International, Design and Testing of Effective Truth in Lending Disclosures: Find-
ings From Qualitative Consumer Research 1 (2008) [hereinafter Findings from Qualitative
Consumer Research]; Findings from Experimental Study, supra note 172, at 1. The research
model in the first report was broad, with report number two an attempt to distill key insights
and follow-up on general findings from the first report. As explained below, when the second
report proved insufficient, Macro revisited its methodology and approach in an attempt to
provide further insights. These insights, in Report 3, are also discussed below.
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participants in terms of gender, age, ethnicity, and level of educa-
tion.”174 The project consisted of two phases.175
Phase one began in 2006 and focused on “how consumers use
credit card disclosures that they currently receive.”176 Macro con-
ducted four focus groups, which “gathered information about the
types of information that consumers currently use for financial de-
cision-making,” while one-on-one cognitive interviews studied how
consumers “read and use specific credit card disclosure forms.”177
Phase two “was devoted to the development and testing of new
forms.”178 This phase consisted of seven additional rounds of one-
on-one cognitive interviews.179 For each round, a “set of revised
model forms [were] developed.”180 In each interview, researchers
asked participants to “think aloud” while using the “mock forms just
as they normally would, and data was collected on which aspects of
each form were most successful in providing information clearly
and effectively.”181 The findings after each round of interviews “led
to revisions to the models for the next round.”182 Macro concluded
its research and presented its preliminary results to the Fed. De-
spite the time and expense, none of these methods led to
conclusive results or recommendations for the Fed.
Thus, in 2008, in an attempt to answer some of these remaining
questions, Macro conducted a quantitative study using mall inter-
cept methodology “to get a more definitive answer to these
remaining questions.”183 The follow up testing in Macro’s “mall-in-
tercept” studies focused on a subset of the original six types of
disclosures related to credit card accounts:184 (1) solicitation and
174. Design and Testing of Effective Truth in Lending Disclosures, supra note 169, at 4, 8;
see also id. app. A: Demographic and Background Information About Participants (“Prospec-
tive participants were also asked questions about their credit card history and credit card
behavior, such as how often they paid the full balance on their card or whether they had
opened a new account in the last 12 months. These questions made it possible to ensure that
the study encompassed a variety of credit card user populations (for example, new versus
experienced credit card users).”).
175. Id. at 1.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 2.
179. See id.; Findings from Qualitative Consumer Research, supra note 1733, at 1.
180. Design and Testing of Effective Truth in Lending Disclosures, supra note 169, at 2.
181. Id. at 2, 8.
182. Id. at i.
183. Findings from Experimental Study, supra note 172, at 1.
184. Design and Testing of Effective Truth in Lending Disclosures, supra note 169, at ii.
FALL 2014] Opening Schumer’s Box 87
application disclosures (often referred to as “Schumer Box” disclo-
sures);185 (2) initial or account-opening disclosures;186 (3) periodic
statements;187 (4) change-in-terms notices;188 (5) convenience
checks;189 and (6) solicitation letters.190 Macro used the sample to
craft policy solutions, identifying a subset of concerns. The Fed
then reviewed their findings and all other available evidence to pro-
vide an empirical baseline for proposed changes.
This methodology was also flawed. Mall-intercept studies are typi-
cally used to gather baseline consumer opinion about products that
a typical consumer can process or understand through touch, taste,
or smell. In other words, the studies are used to determine whether
various consumer products sold in places like malls might appeal to
the typical mall shopper. In exchange for evaluating the relative
strength of a hypothetical new blanket, cola, or pizza, shoppers are
typically given a small cash reward or gift. The use of this methodol-
ogy to create or modify a federal regulatory disclosure-centered
framework for a complex financial instrument, which is neither
purchased nor typically acquired in a mall, is somewhat unusual
and not considered a broadly reliable scientific method even in its
more conventional context.191
Notwithstanding the flawed techniques, the Fed utilized these
studies and recommendations to propose changes to disclosure
185. Id. (Solicitation and application disclosures “are provided on or with direct-mail so-
licitations and applications for credit cards to help consumers compare and shop for credit
cards. Of the disclosures addressed in this study, this is the only one for which a specific
tabular layout is required by the Board.”)
186. Id. (Initial or account-opening disclosures “are provided when the credit card ac-
count is opened to inform consumers about the terms of the account. These disclosures are
mostly provided in cardholder agreements, along with other legal and contractual informa-
tion that issuers opt to include.”)
187. Id. (Periodic statement disclosures “are usually provided to consumers on a monthly
basis to inform them about transactions, fees, and interest charges incurred in the previous
billing cycle. These statements inform consumers of when they must make a payment in
order to avoid additional charges, as well as how large their payment must be. Periodic state-
ments also include the interest rates that apply to the account.”)
188. Id. (Change-in-terms notice disclosures “are given to consumers whenever a change
is made to the terms of the account. They are either included as an insert with periodic
statements or sent in a separate mailing.”)
189. Id. (“[Convenience] checks (sometimes called ‘balance transfer checks’) are given
to consumers as additional devices to access their credit card accounts. They are usually in-
cluded with periodic statements or sent to cardholders in a separate mailing.”)
190. Design and Testing of Effective Truth in Lending Disclosures, supra note 169, at ii.
(Solicitation letters are “[c]redit card offers that are sent in the mail usually include a solicita-
tion letter, along with a required Schumer Box. This letter is primarily for marketing the
offer to consumers, but it usually includes a description of some of the account terms.”)
191. See, e.g., 1 PAUL J. LAVRAKAS, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SURVEY RESEARCH METHODS 448–49
(2008) (“Mall intercept studies rarely use probability sampling methods, and therefore the
results of such a survey cannot be used to determine scientifically the attitudes and opinions
of the target population.”).
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laws. Three years after beginning its disclosure review, the Fed re-
leased some redesigned model disclosures and proposed revisions
to Regulation Z. The Fed paradoxically concluded that the rede-
signed disclosures were “unlikely to be helpful”192 to the people
with “the most at stake in understanding how [credit card] charges
are calculated and how they can be avoided.”193 The Fed found that
“there [were] a number of consumers who lack[ed] fundamental
understanding of how credit card accounts work[ed].”194 These
consumers “tended to be those with lower educational levels, and
were likely subprime consumers (i.e., those with low credit
scores).”195 In particular, a large number of participants misunder-
stood (1) how to calculate interest charges,196 (2) the difference
between fees and interest rates,197 and (3) the allocation of balances
from different types of transactions.198 According to the Fed, con-
sumers required more basic education about how credit cards work
192. BD. OF GOVERNORS, FED. RESERVE SYS., Design and Testing of Effective Truth in Lend-
ing Disclosures, ii (2006) at 53.
193. Id. at 52.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id (“Most participants understood that the Annual Percentage Rate was associated
with the calculation of their interest charges, and that a lower APR generally corresponded to
lower charges. However, very few participants could accurately describe how interest charges
were actually calculated. Many did not understand the balance that would be used in the
calculation each period; some thought it was the new balance on the card, while others
thought it was the sum of new purchases. Others thought that the APR itself was used in the
monthly calculation of interest, rather than a periodic rate. Most participants who could not
describe how interest was calculated were not concerned by their lack of understanding.
They indicated that they trusted that their issuers would perform the calculations correctly,
and that they would call them if the amount looked incorrect. However, in many cases it was
unclear that these participants would be able to identify a mistake if it appeared on their
statement.”).
197. BD. OF GOVERNORS, FED. RESERVE SYS., Design and Testing of Effective Truth in Lending
Disclosures, ii (2006) (“When shown a credit card offer and asked to consider the potential
costs of the account, there were some participants who had difficulty distinguishing between
fees and interest rates (for example, a 5% APR on balance transfers versus a 5% fee on
balance transfers). In some cases, there was a lack of understanding that fees were tied into a
specific action or occurrence, while interest rates would be applied to a balance each period.
Internal references were added to the Schumer Box to try to direct consumers’ attention to
both fees and APRs to help them distinguish between the two. However, testing showed that
while these references helped some consumers, there were others who were still unaware of
the difference between the two.”).
198. Id. at 53 (“Most participants understood that they could be charged different inter-
est rates on purchases, balance transfers, and cash advances. However, testing showed that
while they were aware of this at a conceptual level, many were unable to apply this knowledge
when making decisions. For example, while looking at Schumer Boxes interview participants
were asked to imagine a scenario in which they transferred a balance to their card at a 0%
introductory rate, then made purchases on the same card at a higher rate, and then made a
payment. They were asked whether they thought this issuer would use their payment to pay
off their balance transfer or their purchases. Although the Schumer Box indicated that
lower-APR balances would be paid off first, less than half of participants were able to answer
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to address these misunderstandings.199 The Fed concluded that
“[o]bviously, addressing the problem of consumer understanding
at this level is far outside the scope of this particular project.”200 In
other words, changing disclosure to achieve one of its key goals—
educating vulnerable consumers—was not possible. The Fed’s final
recommendations and the evidence described above formed Con-
gress’s empirical dataset, with which it would soon made sweeping
changes in U.S. credit card policy.
F. An Alternative Evidence-Gathering Framework
Some policymakers close to the debate recognized the weak-
nesses in the GAO and Fed studies. For example, the Acting
Comptroller of the Currency recommended that Congress rethink
its “approach to credit card disclosures . . . of critiquing informa-
tion practices affecting particular issues and then pushing for
correction on a piecemeal basis.”201 In a letter to the Federal Re-
serve Board, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (the
“OCC”) recommended examining “precedents for thorough con-
sumer testing [that] exist[ed] elsewhere in the financial services
world.”202 As the OCC explained, the federal government should
conduct an extensive evidentiary expedition, modeled after the “Fi-
nancial Services Authority (FSA) in the United Kingdom, [which]
used extensive testing in developing revised disclosure require-
ments for a variety of financial products.”203 The FSA study
concluded, among other things,204 that effective disclosures should
“[f]ocus on key information that is central to the consumer’s deci-
sion-making.”205
correctly—some, for example, thought the issuer would pay off transactions in the order that
they occurred. In order to alleviate these misunderstandings, the proposed model includes
text in the Schumer Box describing how payments will be allocated.”).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 54.
201. Regulatory Requirements and Industry Practices of Credit Card Issuers: Hearing
Before the Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. 70 (2005) (pre-
pared statement of Julie L. Williams, Acting Comptroller of the Currency), available at http:/
/www.banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=cf91f5df-
ed9c-48ff-bdf9-3d5f47f5c83e.
202. Id. at 68 (recommending, additionally, that the Board look to “the development of
the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA’s) ‘Nutrition Facts’ label as illustrative of the con-
sumer research needed to produce a highly effective disclosure document.”) .
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. (Some might suggest that recent reforms do indeed focus on this information by
placing additional information in key areas or providing a minimum payment warning de-
signed to alert a consumer about potential missteps. Notwithstanding that such warnings
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In contrast to the relatively limited consumer research and evi-
dence acquired prior to creating the Disclosure Act and its
amendments, the FSA recognized that understanding consumer de-
cision-making first requires understanding the consumer. Rather
than presupposing that consumers need transparent credit card dis-
closures and that transparent disclosures will inevitably lead to
market equilibrium,206 the FSA began its research by defining con-
sumers’ needs.207 The FSA’s 2005 consumer-study, Towards
Understanding Consumers’ Needs, explored a variety of philosophies,
methodologies, and international regulatory frameworks to develop
an in-depth understanding of consumer decision-making.208 This
study was one of many studies collectively aimed at revising disclo-
sures associated with various financial products in the U.K.209
The FSA’s Consumers’ Needs study resulted in a model identifying
three factors, which “played a role in shaping consumers’ decision
making:”210 (1) “personal triggers,”211 (2) “external environmental
factors,”212 and (3) “behavioral factors.”213 FSA researchers utilized
a combination of qualitative primary research, desk research, focus
groups, and one-on-one in-depth interviews with consumers, indus-
try experts, and scholars.214 In related studies, the FSA recruited
“key ethnic groups in the UK” to compare research findings from
“an ethnic minority” to the “‘mainstream respondents” “in order to
might be effective, see infra, the point remains that such designs, warnings, and changes to
disclosures were not prospectively tested, evaluated, or otherwise benchmarked prior to im-
plementation. Thus, while one can be pleased with the results, that doesn’t mean the reform
is correct or even optimal. For example, a warning that failure to pay more each month
might subject the cardholder to jail-time would likely increase payments even more, but re-
formers surely would not advocate such a technique.)
206. Id. at 47 (testimony of Adam J. Levitin, Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown Uni-
versity Law Center) (“It is a bedrock principle of economics, the price theory of demand, that
demand is a function of price. When prices go up, demand goes down, and vice versa. This is
what makes markets work. But in order for markets to work, prices must be transparent.”).
207. See FIN. SERV. AUTH., CONSUMER RESEARCH 35: TOWARDS UNDERSTANDING CONSUMERS’
NEEDS, 1–57 (2005), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/consumer-research/crpr
35.pdf.
208. Id.
209. See, e.g., FIN. SERV. AUTH, CONSUMER RESEARCH 42, supra note 22; FIN. SERV. AUTH,
CONSUMER RESEARCH 34, supra note 22; FIN. SERV. AUTH, CONSUMER RESEARCH 44, supra note
22.
210. FIN. SERV. AUTH., CONSUMER RESEARCH 35, supra note 207, at 6.
211. Id. (“Personal triggers are defined as (usually) non-financial events that have some
financial consequences that may or may not be recognized by the consumer . . . .”).
212. Id. (“[T]he external environment reflects changes outside the direct control of the
individual which are enough to compel that individual to actively seek out a financial product
or service . . . .”).
213. Id. ([B]ehavioral factors are contingent on the consumer’s underlying attitudes,
motivations and culture.”).
214. Id. at 3.
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identify any differences.”215 The FSA’s various studies acknowledged
“the enormous diversity . . . of consumers”216 and recruited consum-
ers from various geographic locations with a range of “financial
sophistication/interest in financial services,” “range of attitudes to-
wards debt,” “range of attitudes towards savings,” and “[a]t least
half in full-time employment.”217 To develop an understanding of
behavioral factors, FSA researchers “examined a wide range of pub-
lished academic and marketing studies, corporate literature and
websites, and university and college dissertation archives as well as
research and analysis which other parties had previously under-
taken.”218 Researchers also explored “different theories about
consumer attitudes and behaviors . . . predominantly from the aca-
demic fields of Psychology, Sociology, Anthropology[,] and
Economics, as well as from work published by commercial market-
ers.”219 In short, the FSA undertook the sort of rigorous, complex,
data-driven analysis expected from a government regulator deter-
mined to develop an efficient, comprehensive, and coherent policy
consistent with consumer behavior and economic growth.
Reviewing Congress’s approach and comparing it to the FSA’s
efforts yields a few broad conclusions. While Congress was attempt-
ing to determine what sort of policy solution would best educate
consumers on how to acquire and use credit cards, it relied on min-
imal evidence gathering and disclosure as an effective tool amidst
growing research about the ineffectiveness of both approaches.
Congress sought to gather evidence over a period spanning more
than a decade about how to improve the existing disclosure-based
credit card regulatory scheme. Such evidence was not particularly
forthcoming and suffered from an array of flaws and uncertainty
about the future direction of the law. Much of the evidence Con-
gress gathered suggested that a continued march toward more
disclosure—absent other change—would not lead to definitively
better outcomes. In contrast, FSA’s more studied reforms had pre-
dictable results that produced a regulatory regime more attuned to
consumer decision-making research and optimal policy behavior.220
215. See, e.g., FIN. SERV. AUTH, CONSUMER RESEARCH 44, supra note 22, at 7.
216. FIN. SERV. AUTH., CONSUMER RESEARCH 35, supra note 207, at 12.
217. Id. at 5.
218. Id. at 4.
219. Id.
220. Through a variety of metrics, the FSA’s long-term strategy appears to have resulted
in several successes, judged by a variety of metrics. See, e.g., FIN. SERV. AUTH., DELIVERING
CONSUMER PROTECTION (2012), available at http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/annual-
report/fsa-annual-report-12-13-section-4.pdf. The FSA’s report described how it learned les-
sons from behavioral economics in order to better understand consumer decision making
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However, those engaged in the reform debate still sought to cre-
ate and eventually pass a comprehensive credit card reform, which
eventually became the CARD Act. The reform has two parts: a sub-
stantive change in rules about what issuers could charge in certain
cases and a series of changes in disclosure.221 The substantive credit
card rule changes have proven somewhat successful in mapping
policy changes to desired consumer outcomes.222 But scholars have
given less attention to the nexus between the evidence available at
the time of the CARD Act, and the connection between that evi-
dence and continued focus on disclosure as an education and
behavior-modifying solution.223 While possibly too optimistic or im-
practical to demand perfection in empirical research prior to
implementation of such reforms, it is nonetheless helpful to pro-
spectively evaluate the connection between the above-evidence and
Congress’s next major reform, the CARD Act.
III. TOWARD MORE DISCLOSURE: POLICY OPTIMIZING
AND THE CARD ACT
Anecdotal evidence and a series of flawed studies had an over-
sized role in influencing congressional information-gathering
regarding credit card consumer matters in recent years. But that
evidence-gathering, flawed as it was, served a broader purpose. Ad-
vocates of sweeping changes to the existing credit card disclosure
and regulation policy started to develop a broad proposal designed
to curb practices they deemed harmful and to provide consumers
with information that they perceived to be better than the existing
disclosure regime. The CARD Act emerged from this iterative evi-
dence-gathering process, and its impact—along with the creation of
and then applied those insights toward a new framework and set of regulations, enforcement
actions, and policies more aligned with these new behavioral insights.
221. A third change that soon followed, the creation of the CFPB, focused on regulating
the supply-side, is discussed infra at Part III.D.
222. See Lauren Jones et. al. The Effects of CARD Act Disclosures on Consumers’ Use of Credit
Cards 40 (2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author) at 40 (Early evidence
suggests that the CARD Act “produced some positive effects in its mission to improve credit
card payment behaviors.”).
223. For example, White hints that a robust education in financial literacy, at least as
applied to credit card use and abuse, could have a net positive impact on the consumers who
are most vulnerable to credit card misuse and inefficient behavior. Yet such education-based
reforms, while mandated by BAPCPA for bankruptcy filers, were not seriously considered by
those advocating credit card reforms. See White, supra note 71 (comparing the absence of
such education in credit card reform proposals to the BAPCPA education mandates and
suggesting that consumer financial education should occur prior to consumer financial dis-
tress caused by credit card misuse, among other things).
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the CFPB—was assumed to be uniformly positive across all con-
sumer groups, particularly those who were most economically
vulnerable. While these last two reforms built upon a growing
awareness that consumers had certain predictable behavioral limita-
tions, the reforms did not directly confront the robust
heterogeneity within this large and diverse group. As a result, re-
cent reforms have left much on the table. This Section revisits the
process and proposes a new solution that requires Congress ac-
knowledge the heterogeneity of consumers and allow card-issuers,
regulators, and academics the ability to gather socio-demographic
information about customers in order to improve the impact of
these reforms.
This Section proceeds as follows. Section III-A imagines what
Congress might have done differently prior to recent reforms dis-
cussed in the previous section. Section III-B focuses on evidence
gathered after the Disclosure Act that informed lawmakers prior to
the CARD Act. Section III-C compares this evidence to reforms pro-
posed during debate and drafting of the CARD Act’s key provisions.
Turning to the period after the CARD Act, Section III-D reviews the
development of the CFPB and the weakness of financial literacy re-
gimes—both modeled on the generic-consumer. Finally, Section
III-E rejects the generic-man approach and calls for consumer-dif-
ferentiated disclosure and education.
A. After the Disclosure Act: Alternative Policymaking Frameworks
What did scholars suggest or predict should have happened fol-
lowing implementation of the Disclosure Act, and what should
lawmakers have done as a policymaking alternative? Some scholar-
ship suggests that lawmakers should have incorporated the
evidence connecting actual consumer use into policy changes while
others suggest that lawmakers should have called the reliance on
disclosure as a market-efficiency tool into question. However, in the
decades since the Disclosure Act, neither analytical approach was
broadly applied to credit card reform.
First, scholars who focus on evidence-based policymaking typi-
cally rely on a quasi-experimental policy-feedback loop approach to
lawmaking.224 The credit card space should be no exception to this
general rule. This approach would have policy makers first clearly
224. See generally, Jean Bae et al., Child Passenger Safety Laws in the United States, 1978-
2010: Policy Diffusion in the Absence of Strong Federal Intervention, 100 SOCIAL SCIENCE &
MEDICINE 30, 31–32 (2014).
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identify the problem. Then, by mapping the policy’s proposed goals
against the problem, lawmakers would create a policy solution.
Over time, outcomes pursuant to that law’s mandates would be eval-
uated against the law’s goals. As the complexity of law, policy, and
outcomes grows, lawmakers would use more sophisticated measure-
ments to further refine the policy. If the lawmaking process were
purely scientific, this policy-learning process could incorporate a
range of evidence from a variety of sources.225 The use of such evi-
dence, in other policy contexts, has led to improved policy
outcomes.226 For example, the evolution of child-auto restraint laws
began by identifying a common problem: the impact of car-vehicle
accidents on child passengers.227 Initially, a range of public-policy
approaches were taken to try to reduce the harms caused by these
accidents.228 But, over time, as research evaluated the impact of va-
rious interventions on the problem, states and lawmakers revisited
their reforms, made changes, and saw greater improvement in out-
comes.229 This evidence-based policy learning process approach
could have been used to inform credit card lawmaking in the dec-
ade(s) following the Disclosure Act, but it was not.230
Some legal scholars suggest that focusing on an ideal nexus be-
tween laws and market outcomes is both hopeless and naı̈ve.231
According to these scholars, policymakers receive far too much in-
formation already232 and, within that already expansive space, lack
the time, resources, or expertise necessary to interpret what the in-
formation means or how it should be deployed in policymaking.233
What these scholars overlook is that evidence-based lawmaking
does not require perfection; it should simply be the preferred ap-
proach in the consumer credit context. This approach would
225. See, e.g., Ross C. Brownson et al., Understanding Evidence-Based Public Health Policy, AM J
PUBLIC HEALTH 99 (9): 1576–83 (2009).
226. See, e.g., Scott C. Burris and Evan D. Anderson, Legal Regulation of Health-Related
Behavior: A Half-Century of Public Health Law Research. ANNUAL REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL
SCIENCE 95 (2013).
227. Id. at 98–99.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. If the problem is imagined as credit card debt growth or inefficient acquisition, one
could imagine a series of iterative reforms learning from what causes the problem and what
can actually reduce the problem and/or its impact on various populations.
231. See generally Ruth V. Aguilera and Cynthia A. Williams, Law and Finance: Inaccurate,
Incomplete, and Important, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1413, 1418 (2009); Mark J. Roe, Corporate Law’s
Limits, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 233, 262–63, 267 (2002).
232. See, e.g., Colby, D. C., B. C. Quinn, C. H. Williams, L. T. Bilheimer, and S. Goodell,
Research Glut and Information Famine: Making Research Evidence More Useful for Policymakers,
HEALTH AFF (MILLWOOD) 27 (4):1177–82 (2008).
233. See, e.g., Brownson, R. C., C. Royer, R. Ewing, and T. D. McBride, Researchers And
Policymakers: Travelers In Parallel Universes, AM J PREV MED 30 (2):164–72 (2006).
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encourage a more comprehensive sample of existing and potential
data and demand testing on whether the deployment of certain pol-
icy-reforms yields ideal consumer outcomes. Given that this policy-
space affects 150 million U.S. cardholders, it is not economically or
fiscally reasonable to divorce evidence from policy-making.
With respect to an issue of this scope and importance, the federal
government could and should benefit from an overabundance of
information. Indeed, during the period studied here, Congress had
an entire apparatus dedicated to this task—the GAO.234 With re-
spect to economic policy, Congress could also rely on the research
arms of an array of qualified experts, including the Fed, the Trea-
sury, and the Council of Economic Advisors. In other contexts, such
as health policy, researchers have developed methods to sift
through reams of data from a variety of populations and contexts to
determine whether a given policy intervention might yield optimal
results.235
Congress could deploy similar methodologies with respect to
credit card regulations over time. The problem could be clearly de-
fined (debt vs. income, aggregate amount of interest payments over
a consumer’s lifetime, low credit scores, high credit-utilization,
etc.). Ideal outcomes could be envisioned (i.e. what is the ideal
level of consumer spending or card-interest rates, or card features,
or utilization, etc.)236 A range of defined problems could benefit
from an evidence-based policy-making structure, which deployed
existing data to measure the potential effect of the policy-solution
on the defined problem.
Regulators or policymakers could apply this structure, agree on a
common set of consumer credit problems, and then hypothesize a
series of ideal outcomes. For example, with respect to debt/income
ratios, FICO scores, and similar measures, regulators could set an
“ideal” value ratio (e.g. 1:100) and a value ratio after which a poten-
tial cardholder would be considered too risky (e.g. 10:1). Congress
or regulators could gauge the median ratio and then deploy both
education and disclosure regimes designed to target that ratio. Sim-
ilarly, card issuers and lenders have bright line cut-offs for credit
234. And now, as a matter of law, the CFPB, which is mandated to produce research –
although the scope and direction of this research are unclear. Future work assessing the
CFPB’s impact should provide evidence of the success of this approach.
235. See, e.g., Moher, D., J. Tetzlaff, A. C. Tricco, M. Sampson, and D. G. Altman, Epidemi-
ology And Reporting Characteristics Of Systematic Reviews, PLOS MED 4 (3):e78 (2007).
236. But see Lauren Willis, Evidence and Ideology in Assessing the Effectiveness of Financial Liter-
acy Education, UNIV. OF PA FACULTY SCHOLARSHIP PAPER 197 (at 15–19) (critiquing FLE and
FLM models and questioning whether any consumer financial decisions and ideal outcomes
can be normed, given the diversity of such decisions and competing values influencing con-
sumer behavior).
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scores,237 and others utilize an efficiency model where a lower
credit score results in a substantially higher interest rate.238 Policy-
makers could set an ideal goal or target number and create
disclosure or education regimes designed to meet or achieve that
number. Regarding spending, Congress could similarly decide to
use existing industry baselines or simply decide (as it does for other
issues) an optimal range of social vs. household spending and then
set out to achieve that balance through education or micro-targeted
disclosures.239 For example, a disclosure mandate could produce
warnings or suggestions when the balance of “positive” vs. “nega-
tive” spending reached a certain proportion. All of these solutions
rely on empirical research segmenting groups but could also be
deployed in a generic-man framework.
Moreover, extending that research within a demographically at-
tuned framework might allow for targeted messaging designed to
stimulate positive behavior from members of certain sub-groups.
Such messaging could range from cultural- or language-specific
messaging or helpful guidance pitched to members of a target
group. For example, an issuer might offer the following language-
customized note in a statement: “Having difficulty making mini-
mum balance payments? Local Community/Language Group X
[for which the cardholder might be a demographic-match] holds
free financial planning information seminars on Tuesdays at 101
Main St.” Banks that wanted to enhance their CRA rating could
utilize their local credit card customer socio-demographics to
micro-target potential first-time home or car buyers or to create,
staff, and manage branches that better fit the socio-demographic
profile of their local user base. More broadly, an issuer with custom-
ers of various ethnic backgrounds clustered in five cities could
cross-deploy advertising, education, or disclosure regimes across
multiple markets that focused on common financial-decision mak-
ing problems within these groups.
However, this focus on reaching members of various socio-demo-
graphic groups with hyper-targeted messaging presupposes that
237. See, e.g., Hussein A. Abdou & John Pointon, Credit Scoring, Statistical Techniques and
Evaluation Criteria: A Review of the Literature, 18 INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS IN ACCOUNTING, FINANCE
& MANAGEMENT 59 (2011), available at http://usir.salford.ac.uk/16518/4/Credit_Scoring_
Statistical_Techniques_and_Evaluation_Criteria_A_Review_of_the_Literature_-_USIR_Ver
sion_(2).pdf.
238. See, e.g., Capital One Important Disclosures, CAPITAL ONE, https://www.capitalone.com/
credit-cards/secured-mastercard/disclosures (last visited Aug. 11, 2014) for an example of an
industry-standard approach to acquisition of a card by a consumer with a poor or low credit
score.
239. This was one of the approaches taken by the FSA. See supra notes 207–19 and accom-
panying text.
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Congress intends to bring evidence to bear on the problem of opti-
mal credit card acquisition and use. To do so, it must close the gap
between the mere commission of research and its actual use to in-
form policies over time.240 Even assuming full congruence between
evidence and policy proposals, the political environment must be
ripe to identify the problem and then bridge the gap between evi-
dence and Congressional action.241 With respect to credit card
policy between the Disclosure Act and the CARD Act (a twenty-one
year span), Congress could have marshaled evidence and aligned
policy goals and solutions. Instead, the opposite happened.
Critics may suggest that Congress did not have good evidence but
might have still made good policy decisions. The CARD Act’s suc-
cess is not primarily rooted in its disclosure regime, but instead in a
novel supply-side command-control model of directly regulating
card issuer practices and business models. That approach was not
the subject of the key studies cited above, yet it emerged as a key—
successful—policy solution.242 On the other hand, the CARD Act’s
disclosure mandates were created without taking into account the
necessary evidence.
Evidence, in a variety of other ways, could have informed reforms
embedded in the CARD Act. Examining the facts that were availa-
ble but not utilized in policymaking discussions, the fraction of
non-mortgage debt based on credit cards increased from 1.3% to
38.1% during the period before and after the Disclosure Act.243 Fur-
ther, by 2001, the number of households with one or more credit
cards increased from sixteen percent before the Disclosure Act to
seventy-three percent.244 Due to the efficiency and ease of lending,
consumers had essentially substituted credit cards for cash
purchases in the years following the Disclosure Act.245 By 1995,
240. See, e.g., JA Weiss, The Powers of Problem Definition: The Case of Government Paperwork,
POLICY SCIENCES 22 (2): 97–121 (1989).
241. JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES (2nd ed. 2003).
242. The success of this solution, absent evidence, was not guaranteed and in fact could
have made matters worse.
243. Federal Reserve Statistical Release G19, Consumer Credit Historical Data, available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/hist/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
244. DAVID S. EVANS & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, PAYING WITH PLASTIC: THE DIGITAL REVOLU-
TION IN BUYING AND BORROWING 88–89 (2d ed. 2005).
245. Todd J. Zywicki, The Economics of Credit Cards, 3 CHAP. L. REV. 79, 85, 88 (2000) (not-
ing that “[s]ome commentators have incorrectly ascribed this explosion to the efforts of
deregulated card issuers to ‘push’ credit cards on unsuspecting consumers. This argument
lacks merit and will be discussed in some detail below. A more plausible explanation for the
rise of credit cards as a transactional medium is their convenience and the other benefits
they offer. In particular, credit cards have increasingly supplanted checks as the preferred
medium for transactions traditionally conducted by check.”).
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credit cards had surpassed cash as the preferred method of con-
sumer payment.246 The ubiquity of consumer lending enabled
Americans to spiral into debt and bankruptcy that rivaled the Great
Depression.247 For instance, credit card debt rose to $683 billion in
2000,248 with 1.3 million Americans filing for bankruptcy in 1997.249
Additionally, low-income individuals were able to obtain credit
due to the loosened standards.250 These consumers included high-
risk individuals who were previously denied credit251 and lower-in-
come individuals who were now able to spend well beyond their
means.252 Studies also suggested that credit card usage encouraged
additional spending.253 Households with credit cards held more
debt on average than households without credit cards.254 Credit
card debt soon became a significant component of consumer debt
and one key vehicle leading to consumer bankruptcy.255 Over the
decades following the 1980s, household revolving debt expanded
from roughly three to more than twelve percent of median family
income.256 By the time of Congressional debates in the mid-2000s,
households holding credit card debt had an average of more than
$15,000 per household.257
These events and such evidence all happened after the Disclo-
sure Act, affording Congress an opportunity to improve the
acquisition and use of credit. However, nothing suggests that these
246. Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, THE FRAGILE MID-
DLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT 108 note 2 (2000).
247. Vikas Bajaj & Julie Creswell, Mortgages Give Wall St. New Worries, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 19,
2007, at C1.
248. U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States, § 25, at 1165 (2002),
http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/02statab/banking.pdf.
249. 144 Cong. Rec. E88 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1998) (statement of Rep. George Gekas, Chair
of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law).
250. Angela Lyons, How Credit Access Has Changed Over Time for U.S. Households, 37 THE J.
OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS 231, 231–32, 301–02 (2003).
251. Ellen Florian Kratz, The Risk in Subprime, FORTUNE, Mar. 1, 2007, http://money.cnn
.com/2007/02/28/magazines/fortune/subprime.fortune/index.htm?postversion=20070301
17.
252. Tom Brown & Lacey Plache, Paying with Plastic: Maybe Not So Crazy, 73 U. CHI. L. REV.
63, 73–74 (2006).
253. Lloyd Klein, It’s in the Cards: Consumer Credit and the American Experience 26
(1999).
254. David I. Laibson et al., A Debt Puzzle in Knowledge, Information, and Expectations
in Modern Macroeconomics 228, 231 (Philippe Aghion et al. eds., 2003).
255. Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, THE FRAGILE MID-
DLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT 129 (2000) (stating, “As the fastest growing proportion of
consumer debt, credit card debt has led the way to bankruptcy for an increasing number of
Americans”). But see Himmelstein et. al., AM. J. MED. 2009 Aug; 122(8): 74–6 (medical
problems contribute to almost half of all U.S. bankruptcies).
256. Michelle J. White, Bankruptcy Reform and Credit Cards, 21 JOURNAL OF ECON. PERSPEC-
TIVES 175 (2007).
257. Id.
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facts and trajectories played a substantive role in recent reforms,
and no evidence supports that disclosure was better at educating
consumers. While it became increasingly apparent that the law’s
key goals were not being met, evidence about the limited efficacy of
disclosure as a market-enhancing consumer tool was also widely
available by the time Congress revisited reform in the form of the
CARD Act and its various provisions.
A second broad strand of legal scholarship developed during this
period suggested that disclosure-based reforms would fail due to
the complexity of individual psychology—evidence notwithstand-
ing. In the years following Schumer’s initial efforts, scholars
coalesced around a few key areas where disclosures were likely to
fail consumers. One of those areas was the abundance and volume
of the disclosure itself.258 TILA and the Disclosure Act required
banks and issuers to provide consumers with excessive information
that was not only time consuming259 but also psychologically over-
whelming.260 Mounting evidence from other consumer credit-
granting regimes suggested that consumers, overwhelmed with in-
formation, would act irrationally and ignore information to simplify
their choices.261 For instance, a study of TILA disclosures found that
less than half of consumers read their statements carefully.262 Schol-
ars also demonstrated that consumers’ ability to recall information
was challenged when they were provided with unnecessary terms,
while they ignored other critical terms.263
258. Michael S. Barr, Sendhil Mullainathan, & Eldar Shafir, Behaviorally Informed Financial
Services Regulation, NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION 3–4 (Oct. 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1121199.
259. Castellana v. Conyers Toyota, 200 Ga. App. 161, 407 (Ga. App. 1991) (noting that it
took a consumer nearly three hours to read the car purchase and financial documents).
260. Jessica M. Choplin, Doomed to Fail: A Psychological Analysis of Mortgage Disclosures and
Policy Implications, 32 No. 10 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP. 11, 12 (Oct. 2013).
261. Eldar Shafir, Itamar Simonson, & Amos Tversky, Reason-Based Choice, 49 COGNITION
11 (1993) (providing that this simplification might lead a consumer to make a decision based
on only one or two variables and focus more on the short-term, at the expense of all other
variables and information); Lauren E. Willis, Decision-Making and the Limits of Disclosure: The
Problem of Predatory Lending, 65 MD. L. REV. 707, 780–81 (2006).
262. Thomas A. Durkin, Consumers and Credit Disclosures: Credit Cards and Credit Insurance,
FED. RES. BULL. 201, 209 (table 9) (April 2002) (finding that forty-nine percent of consumers
read their statements carefully in the 2001 survey, compared with only twenty-nine percent of
consumers in the previous 1997 survey).
263. Jessica M. Choplin, Doomed to Fail: A Psychological Analysis of Mortgage Disclosures and
Policy Implications, 32 No. 10 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP. 11, 16–17 (Oct. 2013) (find-
ing that consumers are vulnerable to selective memory when they are reviewing a home loan
disclosure form, demonstrating that disclosures alone are unlikely to protect consumers);
William N. Eskridge, One Hundred Years of Ineptitude: The Need for Mortgage Rules Consonant with
the Economic and Psychological Dynamics of the Home Sale and Loan Transaction, 70 VA. L. REV.
1083, 1133 (1984) (referencing psychological studies that suggest consumers can only digest
“five to seven ‘chunks’ of information – beyond that, processing problems occur”).
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The illusion of educating consumers through increased disclo-
sure may have resulted in an overall increase in credit-based
disclosures without a commensurate increase in the sophistication
of consumers in the card acquisition or use markets.264 Evidence
suggests that the Disclosure Act had not increased competition in
the credit card industry, and interest rates and funding costs did
not exhibit any measurable improvement following the Disclosure
Act.”265 At the same time that evidence challenged the evidentiary
basis for the Disclosure Act, other scholars generally questioned the
efficacy of disclosure as a policy solution for any consumer
problem.
The complexity of disclosures and the way that card issuers and
lenders focused the consumer’s attention on certain terms while
avoiding others were problematic. In the context of home lending,
for example, employees of the lending institution often led con-
sumers through the documentation in a biased fashion.266 This in-
person focus on selectively identifying key terms and avoiding
others267 could, in a parallel context, create uncertainty about
which of the many mandated disclosures was most important—as-
suming that all but a few of them were displayed equally. Some
studies also showed that consumers were more likely to focus on a
particularly memorable feature than absorb and consider addi-
tional details.268 As many disappointed and frustrated consumers
have discovered in other contexts, hidden and surprising terms are
not always unenforceable.269
Scholars also argued that behavioral anomalies drive consumers’
inability to fully read and understand disclosures. For instance, con-
sumers may suffer from behavioral biases, which cause them to
264. In a different context, Hoffman and Wilkinson-Ryan explain that disclosure-as-edu-
cation is an illusory form of regulation, in part, because it shifts policy and legal attention
away from policing terms and it provides consumers with information that they cannot accu-
rately process. See David A. Hoffman & Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, The Psychology of Contract
Precautions, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 395, 435 (2013) (stating, “Thus, mandated transparency pro-
vides an illusory form of regulation; it discourages more substantive policing of terms while
inundating consumers with information that they cannot, and will not, process”).
265. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 300, at 16, 23. An ideal, if imperfect, effect
would have led disclosure of interest-rates to promote consumer shopping for lower-rate
credit cards that would then, in theory, cause a general lowering of card rates for new
acquirers.
266. Jessica M. Choplin, Doomed to Fail: A Psychological Analysis of Mortgage Disclosures and
Policy Implications, 32 No. 10 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP. 11, 12 (Oct. 2013).
267. Id.
268. Eskridge, supra note 263, at 1117–18.
269. For a more recent discussion of this phenomenon, see Hoffman and Wilkinson-Ryan,
supra note 264 at 428. See also Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) (hold-
ing that an arbitration term within a lengthy standard cruise purchase contract was
enforceable despite its lack of immediate visibility to a typical consumer).
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underestimate their future borrowing or deny warning signs of fi-
nancial troubles.270 Other scholars argue that future policies should
consider socioeconomic implications in addition to traditional law
and economic theories.271 Too much information might also cause
consumers to shortcut their acquisition or use strategies, leading to
imperfect outcomes.272 Despite all of the critiques building from
the evidence-based lawmaking and behavioral law and economics
tradition, Congress, in the CARD Act, continued to rely on the edu-
cating function of the existing disclosure framework as one tool in
its regulatory arsenal.
B. Evidence as Applied: The CARD Act Reforms
The CARD Act, which Representative Carolyn B. Maloney au-
thored and 128 members of the House cosponsored, was originally
proposed in 2008 as The Credit Cardholders’ Bill of Rights.273 In
2009, the Senate Banking Committee reviewed and offered amend-
ments to the bill. These amendments, however, were based on
policy ideas and prescriptions that predated all of the studies de-
scribed in Section III and thus do not appear to be linked to any of
the aforementioned empirical evidence Congress gathered to evalu-
ate the effectiveness of existing disclosures.274 Subsequently,
Congress passed the CARD Act, which incorporated the Senate
Banking Committee’s amendments and also “codified and strength-
ened various Federal Reserve regulations” issued in 2008.275
In short, the CARD Act targeted the following practices: (1) “uni-
versal default;” (2) “unilateral change in terms/‘Any Time, Any
Reason’ Provisions;” (3) “retroactive interest rate increases;” (4) “al-
location of payments;” (5) “unreasonable and excessive fees;” (6)
270. Bar-Gill, supra note 69, at 1418 (2004) (determining that credit disclosures are
meaningless if a consumer is in denial of his own financial situation).
271. William K. Black, The Imperium Strikes Back: The Need to Teach Socioeconomics
to Law Students, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 231, 236–37 (2004).
272. I. Janis & L. Mann, Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice and Com-
mitment (1977) (noting that a stressful financial decision may cause the consumer to
procrastinate, shift the responsibility of the decision onto another, perhaps inadvertently
shifting the decision to a predatory lender, or defensively avoiding the decision-making
process).
273. BILL SUMMARY AND STATUS, H.R. 627, 111th Cong. (2009) http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d111:h.r.00627.
274. Senator Dodd Wants to Expedite the CARD Act, GET DEBIT (2009) http://www.getdebit
.com/debit-news/senator-dodd-wants-to-expedite-the-card-act. (describing Senator Dodd’s
efforts to enact similar provisions in 2004, 2005, and 2008).
275. Darryl E. Getter, Cong. Research Serv., RL34393, THE CREDIT CARD MARKET: RECENT
TRENDS AND REGULATORY ACTIONS 9 (2009).
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“unfair methods of computing finance charges;” and (7) “minimal
notice and lack of disclosure.”276 The CARD Act’s reforms included
two distinct categories: command-based reforms277 that changed
rules or mandated market and disclosure-based reforms278 that pro-
vided new or differently-worded information. The command-based
reforms have proven successful, in part, over time.279 But evidence
of the efficacy of the disclosure-centered portions of the reforms is
less certain.
Congress did not develop the CARD Act’s disclosure-based re-
forms as a response to evidence from Congressional studies or the
psychology of disclosure. For example, payoff-timing disclosures
were a solution for at least five years prior to the CARD Act.280 Dem-
ocratic Congress members unsuccessfully advocated the approach
as an amendment to the BAPCPA.281 When debate opened for the
CARD Act legislation, they reintroduced the payment-focused solu-
tion.282 Consumer advocates supported the solution as “one of the
few disclosures that [would rise] above the clutter and [would]
276. S. REP. NO. 111-16, at 4–8 (2009).
277. These reforms included attempts to outlaw “risk-based pricing” and to prohibit “ret-
roactive interest rate increases, forced issuers to re-allocate payments in a fashion designed to
pay-off the highest-interest purchases first. It allowed consumers to reject a recently issued
card prior to use, limited issuers from charging various types of fees, required a review of
increased account rates, and eliminated a practice known as “double-billing,” prohibited
credit card issuers from increasing rates in the first year after a credit card account is opened,
except under certain circumstances.
278. Mark Jickling, Cong. Research Serv., 7-7784, Credit Card Bills: H.R. 627 as Passed
the House and the Senate Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute 2 (2009).
279. But see, e.g., Sumit Agarwal et al. Regulating Consumer Financial Products: Evidence from
Credit Cards (October 3, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2330942; Jones et al.,
supra note 222, at 41 (suggesting that the “Minimum Payment” provision is a disclosure and
resulted in net consumer savings).
280. Kathleen Day & Carline E. Mayer, Credit Card Penalties, Fees Bury Debtors, WASHINGTON
POST, Mar. 6, 2005, at A1.
281. Regulatory Requirements and Industry Practices Hearing, supra note 67, at 7 (state-
ment of Sen. Daniel K. Akaka); see also id. at 117 (prepared Statement of Edmund
Mierzwinski, Consumer Program Director, U.S. Public Interest Research Group) (“We were
disappointed when the Senate rejected the similar Akaka amendment during floor consider-
ation of the draconian bankruptcy bill, S. 256, successfully and aggressively sought by the
credit card industry and enacted into law at lightning speed this Congress, despite no evi-
dence of bankruptcy abuse. Instead, that new bankruptcy act includes yet another virtually
worthless generic disclosure. That disclosure was approved and signed off on by the industry
simply because it will not work to reduce the credit card debts that cripple many American
consumers.”).
282. Id. at 7 (statement of Sen. Daniel K. Akaka) (The CCMPWA: (1) required a “mini-
mum payment warning notification on monthly payments stating that making the minimum
payment will increase the amount of interest that will be paid and extend the amount of time
it will take to repay the outstanding balance[;]” (2) “require[d] companies to inform con-
sumers of how many years and months it would take to repay their entire balance if they
make only minimum payments[;]” (3) required disclosure of “the total costs in interest and
principal if the consumer pays only the minimum payment[;]” (4) required “that credit card
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make a difference, and that [was] the reason banks vehemently op-
pose[d] this proposal.”283
During the CARD Act hearings, credit card issuers opposed
mandatory payoff timing disclosures284 and disputed their potential
efficacy.285 In response to a congressional request for information
on minimum payment disclosures, the GAO conducted another
study in 2006 on the feasibility, usefulness, and design of custom-
ized minimum payment disclosures.286 Ultimately, the GAO study
concluded that customized minimum payment disclosures would
provide more information to consumers but that the impact of
these disclosures was not consistent across different sets of con-
sumer groups.287 Generally, cardholders and others “found
customized disclosures on the consequences of making minimum
payments useful; however, opinions on the extent to which the dis-
closures would influence cardholders’ payment behavior varied.”288
Nonetheless, the provision survived.
The solution was enacted as a “Minimum Payment Warning,”289
but five years of additional evidence did not sway policymakers away
from disclosure as the solution. Despite the GAO study and relevant
Congressional testimony, the CARD Act enacted disclosures that
companies provide useful information so that people can develop strategies to free them-
selves of credit card debt[;]” (5) required that consumers would . . . be provided with the
amount they need to pay to eliminate their outstanding balance within 36 months[;]” and
(6) required that creditors establish a toll-free number so that consumers can access trustwor-
thy credit counselors.”).
283. Id. at 117 (prepared Statement of Edmund Mierzwinski, Consumer Program Direc-
tor, U.S. Public Interest Research Group).
284. See id. at 71 (prepared Statement of Antony Jenkins, Executive Vice President, Citi
Cards) (asserting that low minimum payment requirements “offer customers the flexibility to
adjust their monthly payments to reflect their preferences and monthly cash-flow situation.”).
285. Id.
286. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-06-434, Credit Cards: Customized Minimum
Payment Disclosures Would Provide More Information to Consumers, but Impact Could Vary
4 (2006).
287. Id. at 37.
288. Id. at 9; id. at 4, 9–10 (“Credit card users can be characterized into two groups—
those who use their cards for purchases but consistently pay their outstanding balance in full
every month (convenience users) and those who carry a balance on their cards (revolvers).
Different data sources report that in 2004 revolvers represented between approximately 46
and 55 percent of cardholders . . . Among the 112 cardholders we interviewed, when offered
a choice of receiving either a customized disclosure, the generic disclosures of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, or no disclosure at all, 57 percent of the revolver cardholders—who typically carry
balances on their cards and thus would be most likely to find information on minimum
payment consequences useful—preferred to receive customized disclosures. While several
convenience users—who pay their balances in full each month—also preferred the custom-
ized disclosure, the majority (60 percent) said they would be satisfied with receiving either
generic disclosures or none at all.”).
289. Mark Jickling, Cong. Research Serv., 7-7784, Credit Card Bills: H.R. 627 as Passed
the House and the Senate Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute 1 (2009).
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were nearly identical to the provisions of Senator Dodd’s earlier
proposals, bypassing all of the “evidence” described in Sub-Sections
II.C-II.E above.290 The CARD Act’s other substantive disclosure-
based reform “require[d] issuers to provide 45 days advance notice
of interest rate increases, and grant[ed] cardholders the right to
cancel the card and pay it off under the old terms.”291 The empiri-
cal validity of these reforms was uncertain. However, Congress
bundled all of the reforms together and approved them collectively
soon after the 2008 elections.
In May 2009, President Obama signed the CARD Act, which he
suggested would include the “most sweeping changes” in decades,
regulating “how credit cards [would be] marketed, advertised[,]
and managed.”292 Nevertheless, whether the CARD Act would
achieve any of its proposed goals or whether its soon-to-be-imple-
mented solutions were aligned with existing evidence remained
ambiguous. The CARD Act, while ultimately successful in many re-
spects, still left the work of aligning existing and future consumer-
based evidence with more optimal policy-making or regulatory re-
forms. Section III-C discusses the future of such reform, builds on
the recent work of legal scholars, focuses on revisiting financial lit-
eracy and challenges the universal-nature of current disclosure
models.
C. Beyond the CARD Act
When assessing the future direction for credit card law and pol-
icy reform, Professors Oren Bar-Gill and Elizabeth Warren’s
influential work is the obvious starting point because it has driven
much of the academic dialogue concerning credit product
problems during the past decade.293 The extent of Bar-Gill and
Warren’s influence to date includes thousands of responsive com-
ments and articles from both domestic and international law
reviews.294
290. S. 499, 109th Cong. 3 (2005).
291. S. REP. NO. 111-16, at 8 (2009).
292. Connie Prater, Obama Signs Credit Card Reforms Into Law, CREDITCARDS.COM (May 22,
2009), http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/obama-signs-credit-card-law-1282.php#
ixzz23PVKgKHK.
293. See Oren Bar-Gill and Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1
(2008).
294. See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann, Regulation in the Fringe Economy Symposium: After the
Great Recession: Regulating Financial Services for Low- and Middle-Income Communities,
69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 729 (2012); Todd Zywicki, Striking the Right Balance: Investor and
Consumer Protection in the New Financial Marketplace: Article: The Consumer Financial
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Bar-Gill and Warren’s 2008 article Making Credit Safer included a
laudably innovative approach to credit card reform and new “prod-
uct safety” regulations for the industry that could improve
consumers’ experience in the market.295 The article also acknowl-
edged that most consumers are imperfectly informed, imperfectly
rational, or both. The authors’ exhaustive research of consumer be-
havior illustrated the complexity—perhaps futility—of disclosure’s
potential impact. The article called for the creation of an entity,
later the CFPB,296 which could engage in a host of both regulatory
and research actions.297 Advocates—and the CFPB itself—seized
first on creating the structure of the regulatory framework and have
only more recently focused on engaging the consumer research
portion.298 This renewed focus on connecting research and evi-
dence with regulatory policy and lawmaking could assist in bridging
the gap between what is currently known about consumer credit
behavior and where future research and policymaking is heading.
The CFPB is modeled on the FDA,299 partly because the FDA’s
market-signaling function allows the general public to develop rela-
tively low levels of sophistication for product choice—assuming
such products are safe. Should the public now make similar assess-
ments with respect to consumer financial instruments? But unlike
the prescription drug market, consumer demand for credit does
not have a helpful intermediary, like a doctor, who can filter infor-
mation and who carries his or her own product- and market-
expertise. Despite proposing a path-breaking solution, those imple-
menting the CFPB model relied on the insights of those who study
administrative law and regulatory frameworks moreso than human
Protection Bureau: Savior or Menace?, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856 (2013) (domestic law re-
views); Luke Nottage and Souichirou Kozuka, Lessons from Product Safety Regulation for
Reforming Consumer Credit Markets in Japan and Beyond, 34 SYDNEY L. REV. 129 (2012)
(international law review).
295. See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 293.
296. Id. at 98, proposing the core functions of what would become the CFPB.
297. See also Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-Literacy Education, 94 IOWA L. REV.199, 283
(2008). In contrast to Bar-Gill and Warren, Willis considers the role of consumers in more
depth throughout her critique of a proposed solution to consumer credit problems. How-
ever, she similarly dismisses a solution that focuses entirely on the consumer, instead
concluding that negative outcomes are a result of the interaction between the consumers and
the market, which Congress must regulate in combination to be effective.
298. For example, the CFPB’s first annual report did not offer substantial insight into the
research team’s long-term projects and implied that the team was not yet substantively
staffed. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, BUILDING THE CFPB: A PROGRESS REPORT 28
(2011), available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/2011/07/Report_BuildingTheCfpb
1.pdf.
299. Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 293, at 99.
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behavior.300 However, to engage with changing consumers’ re-
sponses to reform, scholars would re-engage the larger question of
how to best influence consumer choices from a cognitively optimal
vantage point. To do that, as described in Section III supra, educa-
tors and issuers should utilize socio-demographic data and insights
when examining evidence on consumer card use and attempting to
optimize disclosure, which federal law forbids. Presently, the
CFPB’s existing enforcement regime does not encourage acquisi-
tion of and policy experimentation with customers’ socio-
demographic information.
When the CARD Act was passed, the connection between the effi-
cacy of disclosures and the increasing reliance on such disclosures
was uncertain. In other words, those advocates who still preferred a
disclosure-based regime were optimistic in the face of little direct
evidence of its efficacy. For example, Bar-Gill and Warren’s disclo-
sure reforms acknowledged that assumptions about consumer
reality were “untested” and that both theory and evidence sug-
gested that regimes built upon consumer rationality would prove
unrealistic or be contradicted by existing data.301
The remainder of this Article suggests a demand-focused legisla-
tive intervention and points toward further research and evaluation
of its efficacy. Though the CARD Act does not rely entirely on dis-
closure and directly regulates certain credit card practices, some of
its provisions rely on a disclosure strategy. Those disclosures still
reflect the one-size-fits-all strategy of prior statutes. Yet more focus
is needed on consumers as definable, diverse groups.302 Given the
diversity of consumers and the existing exploitation of their lack of
information, policymakers should consider consumers’ unique
characteristics as individual members of identifiable groups and use
these distinctions to inform elements of education in the regulatory
solution to improve credit card safety.303 In particular, Schumer’s
300. Id. at 101, inviting those “schooled in administrative law” to help flesh out the
proposal.
301. Id. at 7.
302. See David Adam Friedman, Reinventing Consumer Protection, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 45,
46–47 (2007) (arguing that the consumer protection approach which focuses on a definable
consumer group, either an externally identifiable group or a carefully constructed one, is
most successful because it provides a kind of “hyper-protection,” which policymakers may
provide according to various criteria, it incorporates elements of a direct enforcement ap-
proach by signaling to perpetrators that the definable group is protected in this heightened
manner, and it uses empowerment and education of the consumer group members as
individuals).
303. See generally id. at 47 n.11 (2007) (suggesting that policymakers should use identifi-
able or constructed characteristics of consumers to offer heightened protection from fraud,
and noting that one characteristic, a group’s educational deficiencies, may explain why they
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box could better serve a wider range of consumers if it were diversi-
fied like consumers. In this context, personalization would not
require tailoring a statement’s disclosure of information to more
precise quantification of a consumer’s debt level or how to reduce
it as it does in other reform initiatives. Instead, personalized offer-
ings should be tailored to a consumer’s socio-demographic
background, which could mimic generic personalized offerings but
more effectively. But to do so, we must revisit the Equal Credit Op-
portunity Act (“ECOA”), which currently prevents such an
approach.
ECOA was passed as a response to concerns that the newly ex-
panding credit market in the 1970s did not prevent issuers and
lenders from using discriminatory criteria in their decision to grant
or deny credit.304 In addition to prohibiting the use of various socio-
demographic information in granting credit, ECOA required lend-
ers to explain the specific reasons for denying credit, which placed
an additional check on using prohibited criteria when making lend-
ing determinations.305
ECOA’s goals and structure, much like the Disclosure Act, were
rooted in good intentions. But, as access to credit has become eas-
ier in the decades since its enactment and as many forms of
discrimination have declined, Congress has not weighed ECOA’s
present-day value against its informational costs. As with the Disclo-
sure Act and its subsequent amendments, much of the original
evidence for ECOA focused on individual tales of discrimination
and then projected that such discrimination was widespread, harm-
ful, and stifling groups’ economic mobility.306 Further, though
ECOA’s initial prohibitions were tied to concerns about gender eq-
uity in access to credit,307 Congress soon added prohibitions against
discrimination based on race, color, religion, national origin, and
age.308 The extension of a one-size-fits-all approach across a variety
of socio-demographic groups, uncontroversial at the time, assumed
that the credit-access barriers initially cited as a reason to focus on
women applied equally to a variety of other groups and that the
same solution was therefore appropriate.309
are targeted in the first place). Although not all problematic consumer credit experiences
will be fraud, the suggestion may still be a valid way to approach general reforms.
304. S. Rep. No. 278, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1973).
305. 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2006).
306. S. Rep. No. 278, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1973).
307. Id.
308. 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2006).
309. S. 1927, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
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But ECOA’s well-intentioned prohibition on socio-demographic
data-gathering solves a problem that has substantially diminished
and creates barriers for consumers who intend to rely on its provi-
sions. First, ECOA’s focus was on access to credit, not
discrimination in its use, and so it still assumes a world where denial
of credit is common and takes place in face-to-face transactions
fraught with reliance on stereotypes and individual judgments—not
computer scoring and automated replies. Second, ECOA mandated
that issuers cannot collect certain socio-demographic information,
which limits its power as an anti-discrimination tool. ECOA claims
are difficult to prove because the burden of proof shifts to the
plaintiff unless the plaintiff can provide direct evidence of discrimi-
nation, which is rare and difficult to establish. In order to prove
credit-discrimination under ECOA, the plaintiff must show (1)
membership in an ECOA protected class, (2) that he or she applied
for and was qualified for credit, (3) that the credit application was
rejected despite his or her qualifications, and (4) that the lending
institution or card-issuer continued to approve credit for applicants
with similar qualifications absent the group membership.310 Be-
cause card issuers do not collect the socio-demographic
information of those seeking credit (and do not consummate these
transactions face-to-face), it becomes virtually impossible for those
who are denied credit to gather evidence that discrimination oc-
curred.311 Given the changes in the credit marketplace over forty
years, an absence of evidence that access to credit remains a prob-
lem across all of ECOA’s protected groups, the inability of group
members to sustain litigation due to data-collection restrictions,
and evidence that heterogeneity of consumers exists both between
and among socio-demographic groups, it is appropriate to question
the ECOA’s prohibitions as applied to credit card issuers. As ex-
plained below, removing those restrictions would allow issuers and
regulators to experiment, data-gather, and analyze behavior—all of
which would enhance market efficiency.
Socio-demographic variables substantially influence everything
from a person’s political psychology and cultural norms to his or
her spending habits and family structure. For example, card issuers
could gather language information as part of the issuing process.
They could then deploy statements and disclosures in the primary
310. Rowe v. Union Planters Bank, 289 F.3d 533, 535 (8th Cir. 2003).
311. Latimore v. Citibank Fed. Savings Bank, 151 F.3d 712 (7th Cir. 2008) (where a racial
discrimination in loan-making claim against Citibank failed, in part, because of the inability
of the plaintiff to gather the non-existent racial-classifications of other similiarly situated
applicants).
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cardholder’s first language, which would allow for a better under-
standing of the card’s terms.312 Or, if the card-issuer knew that
members of certain cultural groups were more likely to engage in
sub-optimal spending/payment patterns, issuers could frame disclo-
sures with cultural references or examples to help guide the
consumer to a more optimal choice. In short, they could couple any
number of personalized offerings with social-science predictive data
to better educate and inform consumers and increase rational deci-
sion-making—which is, after all, the primary goal of disclosure
advocates.
However, the ECOA prohibits gathering and utilizing this infor-
mation. As a result, it is unclear whether the “failure” of financial
literacy and disclosure is rooted in their generic-man norming or
other factors. To allow for policy-experimentation consistent with
existing evidence, Congress should amend the ECOA to allow issu-
ers to gather customers’ socio-demographic information. Thus,
researchers, regulators, and (with some caveats) issuers could use
that information to produce better disclosure, better education,
and better market outcomes.
D. Revisiting Financial Education And Literacy
Scholarship has proven that “consumers make systematic mis-
takes in their choice of credit products and in their use of these
products.”313 As Bar-Gill and Warren frame it, “[t]hese observed
mistakes indicate the existence of deficits in either information or
rationality—or both.”314 Evaluating existing research, Bar-Gill and
Warren show that consumers pick sub-optimal credit offers.315 A re-
newed focus on group-based financial literacy could help right this
ship. For example, scholars assessing evidence and the trajectory of
scholarship since the Disclosure Act have shown that subsequent
changes in disclosure regimes should both acknowledge irrational-
ity and consider the role of information campaigns or financial
education as a more substantive evidence-informed intervention.316
Nonetheless, financial literacy as a solution to the credit card cri-
sis has its critics. Willis believes that “the prospects for financial
education as an effective policy tool are bleak” considering “the
312. TILA contemplates such a regime only with respect to statements and disclosures
sent to Puerto Rico.
313. Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 293, at 26.
314. Id. at 26–27.
315. Id. at 33.
316. See, e.g., CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 344, at 33.
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skills and biases with which most consumers currently operate.”317
The consumer financial “products available in today’s marketplace
are bountiful, manifold, and dynamic.”318 Further, “[e]fforts to
teach consumers the meaning of APR . . . have failed spectacu-
larly.”319 Willis critiques the proposed “solution” to consumer credit
problems through disclosure, and others have since suggested that
this critique is merited.320
In response to this critique, it may be reasonable to initially as-
sume generic-man financial literacy models do not work. The same
empirical weaknesses of the Disclosure Act’s approach—namely
that the education models are one-size-fits-all when a more
nuanced and socio-demographically attuned approach might yield
better results—could cause this failure. If it is possible, indeed
likely, that a consumer-differentiated approach would yield greater
efficacy, definitive proof of financial literacy’s failure is unclear.
Even if broadly addressing consumer financial literacy is too
costly and inefficient, taking into account the unique financial-liter-
acy failings of distinct consumer groups is possibly a more efficient
way to optimize regulatory reforms.321 This optimization is espe-
cially true given the level of sophistication of the market and the
depth and breadth of knowledge credit issuers possess about con-
sumers based solely on their use of the credit products. Bar-Gill and
Warren describe how such information “can then be categorized by
demographic or geographic groups” to create “powerful prediction
models for others in similar groups.”322 If ECOA permitted issuers
to gather socio-demographic information, policymakers and regula-
tors such as the CFPB could require that issuers also share that
information. With this new information, issuers and regulators
could analyze consumer outcome data to better tailor reforms for
credit product consumers or to create innovative products unique
to certain consumer credit markets.
317. See Willis, supra note 297, at 211.
318. Id. at 212.
319. Id. at 219.
320. See Daniel Fernandes et al, Financial Literacy, Financial Education and Downstream Fi-
nancial Behaviors 9–10 (2014) (forthcoming in Management Science) (reviewing prior studies
through meta-analysis, conducting original studies, and concluding that there is virtually no
link between financial literacy/education and consumer financial behavior).
321. See Willis, supra note 297, at 260 (“[T]hus far. . .financial-literacy education is not
demonstrably effective and probably never will be an effective solution to consumer finance
problems.”); Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 293, at 13 (“Consumers are uninformed because
information is costly to acquire.”).
322. Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 293, at 23–24.
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Bar-Gill and Warren recognize the harm that “unsafe” credit
products cause consumers.323 They conclude that substantial nega-
tive effects, including financial distress to the individual consumer
as well as widespread market distortions, are not distributed evenly
among consumer demographics.324 But the causes of these distor-
tions or how existing law and regulations exacerbate this problem
are unknown because of the generic-man approach. Consumer ad-
vocates and policy makers who care about such disparate impact,
with the proper data available, could build upon the research of
Bar-Gill, Warren, and others using consumer-level data and analysis
focusing on sub-group differences and supplemented by the careful
lessons about the overall efficacy of existing disclosure models.
E. Revisiting Generic-Man Disclosures
Aside from revisiting the efficacy of directly educating consumers
through targeted financial literacy, policymakers can also use ex-
isting behavioral and survey evidence to reconsider using the
generic one-size-fits-all financial disclosure models. Professors Ben-
Shahar and Schneider focus explicitly on the shortcomings of this
approach as applied to the acquisition of credit.325 When deciding
to acquire a credit card, consumers do not receive information,
read, understand, or apply it correctly to their decisions.326 As Ben-
Shahar and Schneider concluded, there is a “great paradox of the
Disclosure Empire [as it] grows, so also grows the evidence that
mandated disclosure repeatedly fails to accomplish its ends.”327
Ben-Shahar and Schneider’s work provides a nexus between evi-
dence and disclosure policy and focuses on how disclosure works
generally, as opposed to how it works with respect to consumer fi-
nance. As they describe, disclosure works effectively only when the
mandates are clear, the problem is identified, the appropriate dis-
closure is used, and the disclosure is written at the appropriate
level.328 Each step is problematic.329 The primary purpose of man-
dated disclosure is “to supply the information people need to make
better decisions.”330 However, if “a mandated-disclosure regulation
323. Id. at 56–69.
324. Id.
325. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 30, at 665.
326. Id. at 717.
327. Id. at 665.
328. Id. at 679.
329. Id.
330. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 300, at 730.
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fails to accomplish its purpose, it cannot be justified even if its cost
is small.”331 One unintended cost, for example, occurs when man-
dated disclosures “crowd out useful information . . . . [and] reduce
the attention” that consumers will give to pertinent information.332
Thus, if scholars and policymakers insist upon the contextual ef-
ficacy of existing credit card disclosure regimes, they should
reexamine this neutral generic-man disclosure model. Applied evi-
dence is required to fundamentally improve the modern disclosure
regime, as behavioral science makes the limitations of existing dis-
closures clear. Ben-Shahar and Schneider argue “mandated
disclosure cannot reliably improve people’s decisions and thus can-
not be a dependable regulatory mechanism.”333 Failing to truly
understand the demand-side variable (the consumer and her be-
havioral psychology), “mandated disclosure not only fails to achieve
its stated goal but also leads to unintended consequences that often
harm the very people it intends to serve.”334 These unintended con-
sequences suggest that a rigorous focus on specialized disclosures,
unique to various sub-groups, might prove successful.335 While such
targeted solutions on their own may not implement dramatic safety
reform across the credit market, the underlying goals of such spe-
cialized regulations are worth pursuing and might otherwise
remain unaddressed.336 If a large part of the inequality in this “spe-
cies of contract” is consumers’ lack of sophistication, Congress
should try to not only enhance the sophistication of consumers but
also, perhaps more importantly, the sophistication of the regula-
tions that protect them.337 Evidence-based policymaking can
331. Id.
332. Id. at 737.
333. Id. at 705.
334. Id.at 647.
335. This intervention also generally builds on arguments by Rachlinski and Mitchell,
among others, whose focus on the intersection of policy reforms, cognitive differences, and
socio-demographic variance substantially inform my approach. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,
Cognitive Errors, Individual Differences, and Paternalism, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 207 (2006); Gregory
Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessimism of the New Behavioral
Analysis of Law, 43 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1907 (2002).
336. But see Friedman, supra note 302 at 60–61 (2007) (suggesting the related but oppo-
site conclusion with respect to consumer fraud that such targeted “group protection
enhances the perpetrator’s risk in targeting that group and shifts fraud activity toward the
total pool of less vulnerable individuals” and concluding that “hyper-protection can enhance
deterrence in the general population.”).
337. Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 293, at 7 (2008). See, also, Friedman, supra note 302
for the proposition that hyper-protecting one defined group could result in enhanced pro-
tection across the general consumer population, which a concerted effort to educate that
group might achieve and make them into the “informed minority” that Bar-Gill and Warren
dismiss.
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successfully interact with disclosure-scholarship to help refine ex-
isting policy. As Bar-Gill and Warren explain, “the data show[s]
substantial error rates for the simplest credit decisions. In the credit
card area, more complex credit decisions remain untested.”338
The solution is not merely more disclosure, nor should it be sim-
ply more information for the end-user so that he can have third
parties or competing issuers analyze it. Instead, the solution can
and should reexamine the role a consumer’s socio-demographics
can play in shaping disclosure to achieve a more optimal result—
educating consumers and helping them make better choices and
achieve more optimal results. If issuers can micro-target consumers
with tailored disclosures that explicitly rely on and learn from both
an individual’s group memberships and individual habits, that dis-
closure is likely to produce better outcomes.
CONCLUSION: TOWARD EVIDENCE-BASED POLICY
AND FUTURE REFORM
Credit card policy reform is situated in an anecdotal or empiri-
cally shaky approach to legislation. Congress could focus on
consumers rather than legislating by anecdote.339 Legislation by an-
ecdote works when empirics are lacking because their absence
creates a vacuum in which any reform seems better than none. The
opposite is also true: when empirical data are available, those work-
ing towards reform can avoid legislating by anecdote given the
evidence upon which to base scientific conclusions.340 This form of
evidence-based policy making has worked elsewhere, and Congress
should deploy it in this context as well.
The CARD Act successfully forced issuers to change how credit
cards actually work. Now Congress, regulators, or the CFPB must
focus on consumers and how to more optimally educate them and
change sub-optimal behavior. Revisiting the history of consumer
credit card regulation leads to a few key conclusions about how to
do this. First, Congress should use quantitative and qualitative re-
search to determine the precise information to include in
338. Id. at 37.
339. See Credit Card Practices: Fees, Interest Charges, and Grace Periods: Hearing Before
the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Comm. on Homeland Security and Gov-
ernmental Affairs, 110th Cong. 14 (2007) (statement of Wesley Wannemacher, Consumer,
Lima, Ohio).
340. See, e.g., FIN. SERV. AUTH, CONSUMER RESEARCH 42, supra note 22; FIN. SERV. AUTH,
CONSUMER RESEARCH 34, supra note 22; FIN. SERV. AUTH, CONSUMER RESEARCH 44, supra note
22; FIN. SERV. AUTH., CONSUMER RESEARCH 35, supra note 207.
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disclosure regimes. Second, both disclosure regulation and finan-
cial education could be more effective if the needs and desires of
particular populations and sub-groups are differentiated. Third,
Congress should revisit ECOA’s restrictions and prohibitions on the
acquisition and use of customer socio-demographic information to
accomplish these goals.
If more research focuses on how cardholders acquire and use
cards and the way that financial literacy interacts with varied disclo-
sure regimes, evidence can more effectively inform future credit
card policy-making. Though the CFPB has gathered much empiri-
cal data and produced an array of studies in this area, the research
has not yet had the policy impact many of its advocates had hoped.
Some of the CFPB’s evidence questions the efficacy of the CARD
Act’s key disclosure-centered provisions and finds that the total
amount consumers pay for their credit cards is no higher, on aver-
age, than it was before the CARD Act took effect.”341 In the
meantime, card issuers continue their evidence-based market re-
forms, as they’ve focused their research efforts and billion-dollar
budgets on “drawing psychological and behavioral lessons from the
enormous amounts of data” they collect every day.342 They “study
cardholders from every angle.”343 Card issuers run “tens of
thousands of experiments each year, testing emotions elicited by
various card colors and the appeal of different envelope sizes.”344
The federal government, despite the vast array of resources at its
disposal, has failed to even hint at similar testing strategies, explic-
itly using socio-demographic data. For example, the CFPB could
create a research laboratory similar to a card issuer, where it would
deploy a variety of methodologies to learn how sub-groups of con-
sumers think and for which groups certain reforms are most
effective. However, the CFPB has instead focused on heightening its
341. Leonard J. Kennedy et. al., The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Financial
Regulation for the Twenty-First Century, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1141, 1158 (2012).
342. Charles Duhigg, What Does Your Credit-Card Company Know About You?, N. Y. TIMES
MAG. (May 12, 2009), at MM40, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/17/maga-
zine/17credit-t.html?pagewanted=all.
343. Id.; Duncan A. MacDonald, Viewpoint: Card Industry Questions Congress Needs to Ask,
AMERICAN BANKER at 2 (Mar. 23, 2007), https://www.americanbanker.com/issues/172_58/-
306775-1.html?zkPrintable=true (“No other industry in the world knows consumers and their
transaction behavior better than the bank card industry. It has turned the analysis of consum-
ers into a science rivaling the studies of DNA or the launching of the Discovery spaceship
into orbit. The mathematics of virtually everything consumers do is stored, updated, catego-
rized, churned, scored, tested, valued, and compared from every possible angle in hundreds
of the most powerful computers and by among the most creative minds anywhere. In the past
10 years alone, the transactions of 200 million Americans have been reviewed in trillions of
different ways to minimize bank card risks.”).
344. Id.
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enforcement of ECOA and attempting to eliminate issuers’ and
lenders’ use of socio-demographic information.345
The issuers’ science-centered approach is exactly what one would
expect from a consumer-smart savvy business operation seeking to
maximize revenues in a changing regulatory environment. Yet Con-
gress, throughout decades of tinkering with such laws, has taken a
virtually a-scientific approach. Not only could Congress respond ap-
propriately to the innovations of credit card issuers with more
informed legislation based on rigorous empirical data, but it could
also use the same types of strategies that the card companies use to
maximize consumer responses.346 Legislative efforts, including the
provision of financial-literacy information, could target consumers
based on their age, race, gender, income level, and other relevant
variables.347 While recognizing that consumers have different finan-
cial literacy levels, informational messages could be delivered in
various formats across distinct media with content as diverse as the
consumers. Card issuers clearly recognize all of these distinctions in
their marketing practices, and Congress could certainly follow their
lead to address the issues such practices raise.348
While CFPB researchers have turned initial attention toward a
robust science-driven approach to analyzing and revising much of
the mortgage disclosure and acquisition market, less has been done
regarding credit card markets. Meanwhile, card issuers still lead the
way in understanding consumer credit card psychology.349 For ex-
ample, Capital One’s Card Lab is an interactive “internet site that
lets customers design their own cards.”350 What most people don’t
realize is that “Capital One can watch as [you] navigate the site,
learning more and more” about what level of value you place on
different credit card agreement terms and conducting an enor-
mous real-time, ongoing experiment.”351 This research is exactly
the type of real-time evidence-informed experiment that can bene-
fit consumers, but that the federal government has never tried to
understand or replicate to improve or optimize regulatory solu-
tions. Regardless of how many laws Congress passes or how many
tweets the CFPB gets, until legislators and regulators inform their
345. See, e.g., CFPB Bulletin 2013–02: Indirect Auto Lending and Compliance with Equal
Credit Opportunity Act, http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201303_cfpb_march_-Auto-Finance-Bul
letin.pdf (last visited February 20, 2014).
346. See Charles Duhigg, supra note 342.
347. Friedman, supra note 302.
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views with a more robust and thoughtful empirical approach, ef-
forts to meaningfully regulate the credit card market will continue
to fail.352 It is time to think both more empirically and more theo-
retically about the contents of Schumer’s box.
352. The Card Game, PBS FRONTLINE (2010) (Statement of Shailesh Mehta, Former CEO,
Providian Bank) http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/creditcards/etc/synopsis.html.
